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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
AO  Algemeen Overleg (parliamentary discussion meeting) 
AXO   Abandoned Explosive Ordnance 
CCM  Convention on Cluster Munitions 
CCW  Convention on Conventional Weapons  
CMC   Cluster Munition Coalition 
ECOS European Coalition on Oil in Sudan  
EIF   Entry into Force  
ERW   Explosive Remnant of War 
EP  European Parliament 
FTE  Full-Time Equivalent 
GGE   Group of Governmental Experts  
HRW   Human Rights Watch  
ICBL   International Campaign to Ban Landmines  
IHL   International Humanitarian Law  
IKV   Interchurch Peace Council 
IPCN  IKV Pax Christi Netherlands 
MBT   Mine Ban Treaty  
MP   Member of Parliament 
NATO   Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation 
NSAG  Non-State Armed Group 
PCI   Pax Christi International  
PCN  Pax Christi Netherlands 
SC  Steering Committee (CMC) 
ToR  Terms of Reference 
UN   United Nations  
US   United States (of America)  
UXO   Unexploded Explosive Ordnance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE  
 
The Dutch Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) and Pax Christi Netherlands (PCN) have merged 
into one organisation IKV Pax Christi Netherlands (IPCN) with effect from January 2007. 
References in this report to work or events carried out before this date relate largely to Pax 
Christi Netherlands, while references to 2007 and later and recommendations for the future 
are directed to IKV Pax Christi Netherlands. The usage of the organisation’s name will 
therefore depend on the (overall or historical) context and thus vary throughout the report.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the context of its current strategic multi-annual plan subsidised under the Thematic Co-
financing Programme of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IKV Pax Christi Netherlands 
(IPCN) carries out a series of best practice studies. The present study is the fourth study in 
this series.  
 
Goals of best practice studies 
IKV Pax Christi hopes to achieve the following goals by carrying out these best practice 
studies: 
 The documentation of its (successful) activities; 
 Making available the experiences gained from the best practice studies to project 
managers and others within IPCN to improve its learning capacity;  
 To share best practices and experiences gained with IPCN’s partner organisations 
and strategic allies (Cordaid, Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation 
(ICCO), Interchurch Peace Council (IKV)1, Pax Christi International etc.); 
 To create a basis for policy dialogue with relevant stakeholders;  
 To contribute to policy and strategy building within the own organisation; 
 To contribute to the development of quality criteria within IPCN and to its overall 
evaluation practice. 
 
The main objective of the best practice studies is to derive the positive lessons from existing 
experiences to enable constructive change and improvement in current and future 
programmes. Best practice studies have a more limited focus than full-fledged evaluations in 
that they focus on learning, dialogue and change rather than on upward or external 
accountability. Yet, they share with other evaluative approaches a number of problems such 
as the question of attribution and causality, the replicability of findings, and how to arrive at a 
sound judgement on the basis of often contradictory and multifaceted data (the valuation 
question).   
 
The Disaster Studies Group of Wageningen University has been invited to carry out these 
best practice studies. There are two types of study: one is a more limited study (type I) on the 
basis of a file study and some interviews in the Netherlands, and the other one is a more 
elaborated study (type II), comprising fieldwork in the country of operation as well. The first 
best practice study Informing the Public, Transforming Policy, Pax Christi’s Advocacy and 
Lobby Activities on Colombia, written by Georg Frerks and Hilde van Dijkhorst, was a type I 
study. The second study The European Coalition on Oil in Sudan, 2001-2007, by Georg 
Frerks, was also a type I study. The third study Local Peace Initiatives in Ituri, DRC 2003-
2007, written by Georg Frerks and Pyt Douma was a type II study, including field work in the 
Ituri District in the DRC.  
 
Lobby and advocacy campaigns by IKV Pax Christi 
This report concerns a type I study on IKV Pax Christi’s involvement in the Cluster Munition 
Coalition (CMC). Lobby and advocacy campaigns by IKV Pax Christi generally aim to 
establish public and political awareness and encourage (policy) change. IPCN as well as, 
earlier, its predecessors separately, have been involved in lobby campaigns. IKV and PCN 
have become well-known due to the campaigns against nuclear weapons, especially against 
the so-called neutron bomb and against the placement of cruise missiles on Dutch soil, which 
mobilised in the 1980s ten thousands of people in protest marches and meetings. Another 
Pax Christi campaign was focused on increasing international awareness of the Colombian 
situation and to stimulate a sense of solidarity between the European Community, Colombian 
                                                 
1 With effect from 1 January 2007 IKV and Pax Christi Netherlands have merged into one organisation 
IKV Pax Christi Netherlands.  
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churches, non-governmental organisations (NGO)s and local leaders (see best practice 
study no. 1; Frerks and van Dijkhorst 2005). Both IKV and Pax Christi took part in 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), also known as the Ottowa Initiative. Pax 
Christi was further the coordinating member of the European Coalition on Oil in Sudan 
(ECOS) aimed at reaching an end to oil exploitation in southern Sudan until there was a just 
and lasting peace. After the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord in 2005 ECOS 
shifted its focus towards the management of oil revenue and towards social corporate 
responsibility, including the involvement of local civil society (see best practice study no. 2; 
Frerks 2008).  
 
The selection of CMC as the object of a best practice study and research questions 
Like in the case of ECOS, the Cluster Munition Coalition exemplifies an approach where the 
activities IKV Pax Christi were conducted in the framework of an international coalition. As 
bans on particular categories of weapons need to be effected internationally in order to have 
a meaningful impact, this campaign to achieve a ban on cluster munitions had to be focused 
on national, international and multilateral actors at the same time. Hence, an internationally 
coordinated lobby and advocacy campaign seemed to be the most suitable approach. In 
addition, such a coordinated approach allowed for the pooling of scarce resources, specialist 
knowledge and expertise. On the other hand, it faced at the same large obstacles of a 
political and logistic nature. Issues related to weaponry and security, are generally highly 
charged political topics linked to considerable geo-strategic and commercial interests world-
wide. In addition, armament issues are usually surrounded by high levels of secrecy and 
circumspection, and there is often a reluctance to share information by those involved, even 
in democratic polities. Moreover, coalitions of a diverse group of heterogeneous, mainly non-
governmental actors are generally difficult to merge into effective campaigning machines. It 
may, therefore, not be easy to arrive at concerted NGO-action globally. Hence, the CMC 
formed an appropriate subject for a best practice study. The specific questions mentioned in 
the Terms of reference (ToR) are as follows: 
 
 Which strategy was used during the (Dutch) cluster munition campaign? 
 How successful was the campaign? 
 What lessons can IKV Pax Christi learn for other campaigns? 
 
The present study describes how the CMC-campaign evolved over time and what lessons 
can be drawn. The period covered is from 2003 till 2008 when the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions was signed, but it also mentions some follow-up activities that were carried out in 
2009. It differs from the ECOS or Colombia campaigns studied earlier, in that the focus is not 
on a country or a particular conflict, but on a category of weapons that is spread world-wide.    
 
Definitions of advocacy and lobby 
For the purpose of this study, advocacy is defined as: “the act or process of convincing 
leaders and decision-makers to use their powers and influence to support an issue or cause 
by the making or changing of law, policy or programme and in the allocation of resources” 
(Nukuro 2000: 2).  
 
Lobby is “A group, organization or association seeking to influence the passage or defeat of 
legislation. … By some definitions, lobbying is limited to direct attempts to influence 
lawmakers through personal interviews and persuasion. Under other definitions, lobbying 
includes attempts at indirect, or ‘grassroots’ influence, such as persuading members of a 
group to write or visit their district’s representative and state’s senators or attempting to 
create a climate of opinion favourable to a desired legislative goal” (www.lectlaw.com, 
accessed 18-10-09). 
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Another definition describes lobby as “the act of attempting to influence business and 
government leaders to create legislation or conduct an activity that will help a particular 
organization” (www.businessdirectory.com, accessed 18-10-09). 
 
Lobby and advocacy organisations try to translate public moral outrage into political action by 
turning media attention towards a certain issue or subject, or try and rally support directly 
from people that are able to make changes, i.e. politicians. According to the literature, 
advocacy campaigns have generally successfully mobilised moral outrage into political action 
when the targets are clear, the cause obviously just, and the abuses graphic. Yet, achieving 
political victories in practice and securing their implementation requires continued political 
pressure (Nelson 2000).  
 
Evaluating advocacy and lobby 
Literature on international campaigning by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) pinpoints 
to the difficulty in assessing what impact can be directly related to NGOs’ advocacy and 
lobby activities and what to other factors. As argued by Nelson (2000), “Evaluating impact is 
difficult, and the results are usually ambiguous and debatable, but the process is essential to 
NGOs’ effectiveness and credibility.” Chapman and Wameyo (2001) assert that: “The 
monitoring and evaluation of advocacy and influencing work is critically underdeveloped.  ….  
Current ‘project focused’ monitoring and evaluation systems and methods are inadequate for 
assessing the value of influencing and advocacy work where the emphasis is on the 
development of civil society and its ability to hold decision makers accountable” (2001: no 
page number). These authors argue that advocacy evaluation is compounded by the 
problem of causality and attribution of impact. Moreover, outright victories are rare and often 
compromises need to be reached that may include trade-offs, introducing an element of 
subjectivity when judging the gains. Advocacy may include a whole range of different tactics 
and instruments, and many changes only become manifest at the long term, as policy reform 
is slow and incremental. They also note there is little accumulation of knowledge in this field. 
Chapman and Wameyo recommend that not only outcomes but also processes need to be 
analysed as well as the different interrelated levels at which advocacy takes place and the 
alliances that are forged in the process. With regard to results it is not only policy change that 
matters, but also its implementation. Chapman and Wameyo identify a number of gaps in the 
prevailing knowledge on how to evaluate advocacy. These include inter alia: the working of 
networks and movements, the notion of people-centred advocacy, the conflictual and political 
aspects of advocacy work, the political or democratic space for advocacy, and the issue of 
gender (2001: no page numbers).  
 
Similarly, Kelly remarks that “few organisations … have evaluated their [advocacy] work until 
recently and most have struggled with suitable methods and approaches that enable them to 
be clear about the usefulness of advocacy work” (2002: 4). She adds that the unique 
combination of strategies, targets and outcomes make simple comparisons between 
interventions over time difficult, while effective advocacy itself is seldom a straightforward 
process. Instead it is ‘a gradual accumulation of attention and focus with occasional 
precipitive events’, causing organisations to play multiple roles and relying on many different 
players in often unpredictable contexts (2002: 4). This requires that each campaign should 
be seen as a unique undertaking of which ‘a picture’ needs to be build, next to some more 
general issues usually addressed in conventional monitoring and evaluation studies. In this 
connection, Kelly argues that next to the outcomes or results per se, attention should be paid 
to the strategy and vision, the program logic, the specific objectives, the framing of the 
intervention, the legitimacy of the lobbying organisation, the coalitions and alliances forged, 
and the adaptation of the strategies and tactics to the evolving context and opportunities over 
time. Finally she notes the importance of a joined-up approach as part of a series of 
interventions in a wider programme. The joined-up nature of advocacy relates to attempts to 
embed the specific action in broader initiatives (Kelly 2002: 4-5). 
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Lessons learned from the ICBL 
Williams and Goose, who were actively involved in the ICBL, outline the lessons learned 
which can be derived from the Ottawa process (2008). They especially highlight the 
campaigning model followed that has given rise to what has become known as citizen 
diplomacy. What was unique in the Ottawa experience was that an international movement 
of NGOs acted as a driving force of change on an issue with international security 
implications. This was made possible by common and coordinated action by NGOs, like-
minded governments, UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC). The ICBL “showed that it is possible to work outside of traditional diplomatic forums, 
practices and methods and still achieve success multilaterally” (2008: 182).  
 
Williams and Goose identify a set of key campaigning lessons that could be seen as 
ingredients for a successful citizen diplomacy campaigning model. In the context of this study 
they are only listed; further details can be found in the article by these authors (2008: 183-
187). 
 
Box 1: ICBL campaigning lessons 
  
 Know how to organise 
 Maintain a flexible structure 
 Need for leadership and committed workers 
 Always have an action plan and deadlines, with outcome-oriented meetings 
 Communication, communication and more communication 
 Follow-up and follow-through 
 Provide expertise and documentation 
 Articulate goals and messages clearly and simply 
 Use as many forums as possible to promote the message 
 Be inclusive, be diverse, yet speak with one voice 
 Recognise that international context and timing do matter 
 
Evaluative framework  
In line with the remarks by Chapman, Wameyo and Kelly, this report first provides a fairly 
detailed descriptive, chronological account of the CMC campaign, after which it discusses 
the findings according to themes identified by them as crucial aspects of (successful) 
advocacy and lobby2, as summarised in box 2: 
 
Box 2: Themes for evaluating the success of advocacy and lobby campaigns 
  
 Vision, strategy, objectives and framing of the intervention 
 Results (products, effectiveness (policy change and implementation), impact; transparency 
and accountability) 
 Instruments and actors (legitimacy, efficiency) 
 Causation and attribution 
 Process (networking, alliances and coalitions; local level activity)  
 Dynamics and environment (democratic space) 
 Compromise, trade-offs, politics and conflict 
 People-centred advocacy and gender 
 Joined-up nature of intervention 
 
After that I shall briefly discuss to what degree the lessons learned from the ICBL as 
identified by Williams and Goose (see box 1) have been applicable to the CMC.   
 
                                                 
2 The same evaluative framework has also been adopted for the best practice study on the European 
Coalition on Oil in Sudan (ECOS).  
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Methodology 
This study was based on a desk study of all relevant files on CMC available with IPCN. In 
addition, some questions were asked from the IPCN staff responsible for CMC. They also 
provided additional information that could not be found in the files studied. Financial and 
personnel data were obtained from the respective units within IPCN. The final draft report of 
this study was shared with responsible IPCN staff and was subsequently adjusted on the 
basis of their comments. Normal procedures of probing and cross-checking were applied and 
verbal information compared with information available on file.  
 
Set up of the report 
The present report is organised as follows. Chapter 2 gives background information on 
cluster bombs and discusses the first steps leading to the establishment of the CMC. 
Chapter 3 relates the launch of the CMC and then presents CMC’s international activities 
over the period 2003-2009. Chapter 4 focuses on the activities by IPCN and its partners in 
the framework of the Dutch Cluster Munition Coalition. Chapter 5 contains a thematic 
discussion of the main findings and chapter 6 draws the conclusions. Annexe 1 provides a 
chronology of the international movement to ban cluster bombs. Annexe 2 enumerates the 
sources consulted and used for this study, while Annexe 3 presents the completed 
‘Assessment list evaluation research’ of the Policy Evaluation Department of the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 12 
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2. CLUSTER MUNITION  
 
 
Definition 
Though there have been a range of significant activities on the topic of cluster munitions in 
the period of 1999-2002 (see Annexe I for an overview), the year 2003 was specifically 
salient due to the negotiations of a new Protocol V in the framework of the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva and the establishment of the CMC at a Launch 
Conference in the Hague that united NGOs worldwide aiming at a prohibition of cluster 
munitions.   
 
Cluster weapons or munitions are defined as containers designed to disperse or release 
multiple explosive sub-munitions. Sub-munition is any munition that, to perform its tasks, 
separates from a parent munition. It is designed to explode at some point in time following 
dispersal or release from this parent cluster weapon (Weidacher et al 2005: 7). Cluster 
munitions can scatter between 150 up to 600 sub-munitions (also called ‘bomblets’ or 
‘grenades’) over areas the size of several football fields (‘carpet-bombing’). These sub-
munitions are designed to kill people, start fires, and burn through armour, or perform all 
those tasks at the same time. Cluster munitions can be deployed from aircraft, through cruise 
missiles, or by artillery and rockets. Cluster munitions have reportedly been used in armed 
conflicts in 27 countries and territories since World War II by 15 states, including The 
Netherlands. They were also deployed by non-state armed groups (NSAG) in Afghanistan, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Lebanon and Tajikistan. There are at least 34 documented 
producers of cluster munitions and 58 countries that own cluster munitions of which 39 are 
party or signatory to the CCW.  
 
Between 5 and 30% of the sub-munitions dispersed in operations fails to explode. When sub-
munitions are dropped but do not explode for whatever reason, they pose a serious risk as 
they may still explode when moved or touched. These ‘duds’ (hence the notion of ‘dud rate’) - 
officially called ‘explosive remnants of war’ (ERWs) - function very much like landmines when 
scattered on the terrain, on roads and other physical infrastructure or in agricultural fields. 
There are two types of ERW, i.e. unexploded and abandoned explosive ordnance. 
Unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO) has been prepared for use and has been used, but 
failed to explode. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) has been deployed, but was not 
used and has been abandoned or dumped in the country concerned by a party to an armed 
conflict.  
 
Humanitarian impact 
Apart from the obvious fact that explosives per se form a huge risk for civilian populations 
when used during war, EWRs continue to do so even after the cessation of the conflict. 
Accidents by such ERWs result in multiple mutilations: amputation of limbs, severe burns, 
hearing damage, blindness and wounds caused by fragments of the bomb. People with 
disabilities as a consequence of ERW explosions often face severe forms of societal 
discrimination (UNIDIR 2008: 12-13). UNIDIR also documents the relatively larger impact on 
the poor, as they lack the means to leave contaminated areas and have no alternative 
livelihood options that would expose them less to the risks of ERWs. Generally, males fall 
more often victim to ERWs than females. This is due to the gender-specific division of labour 
especially in agriculture, or may happen due to reasons of ‘social display’, where they take 
unnecessary risks. They also may be the first to return home after conflict and clear 
contaminated lands for agriculture. However, in cases where women traditionally are 
involved in agriculture or have taken over men’s jobs during or after conflict, they account for 
high percentages, too.  
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A high proportion of the victims are children and youth. Brightly-coloured sub-munitions 
shaped like balls may attract children confusing the munitions with toys. In some countries 
children are the largest group of victims. In Lao and Kosovo the percentage of children 
among the casualties was a high 51% and 67% respectively (UNIDIR 2008: 21). Cluster 
munitions further leave a serious psychological impact by creating fear, trauma and stress. 
Symptoms in child survivors of ERW in Lao included nightmares, insomnia, emotional 
detachment, anxiety, depression, headaches and other physical pains not related to physical 
injury (UNIDIR 2008: 12). The UNIDIR report also stated that most child survivors had little 
chance of overcoming the challenges and leading a normal life.  
 
In summary, cluster munitions represent a double danger: as deadly wide-area weapons that 
pose grave immediate dangers when used in or close to civilian areas, and as a long-term 
UXO risk to lives and livelihoods due to their high failure rate. Contamination by cluster 
munitions also complicates the return of refugees, and obstructs post-conflict peace and 
reconstruction efforts in terms of rehabilitation of infrastructure and land use. UNIDIR has 
documented the longer-term negative impact of ERW contamination on infrastructure, 
livelihoods and income generation (2008: 16-19).  
 
Due to their lack of discrimination between civilians and combatants and the excessive loss 
of life in relation to the military objectives, many observers and NGOs have questioned the 
legality of cluster munitions under the principles enshrined in the Geneva Conventions. 
Despite the fact that this type of UXO functions effectively as a land-mine, it was not taken 
care of in the Ottawa Agreement on the abandonment of anti-personnel mines nor under any 
other provision of international law so far. It was from the perspective of unjustifiable 
humanitarian suffering that cluster munitions and ERWs represent, that they became a topic 
for intensive international and NGO action and lobby.  
    
Negotiations on Protocol V of the CCW and NGO response 
In the years 2002 and 2003 international preparations were ongoing by the Group of 
Governmental Experts (GGE) to formulate and adopt Protocol V to the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons (CCW) on explosive remnants of war. The purpose was “to take all 
possible and appropriate steps to protect civilians and humanitarian missions and other 
missions on the auspices of the United Nations from the risks and effects of explosive 
remnants of war”. The protocol envisaged a series of measures in the field of clearance, 
removal and destruction, recording and use of information, protection of civilian populations 
and missions, cooperation and assistance and prevention. 
 
International non-governmental organisations were already critically following these 
preparations from the start onwards, but decided in the course of the year 2003 to step up 
their efforts, especially when it became clear that the preparations in the GGE/CCW were 
less far-reaching than had been hoped for and was deemed desirable. NGOs had serious 
concerns on the non-binding nature of the provisions, and the fact that no steps were 
envisaged to achieve a ban or moratorium on cluster munitions, but rather to formulate forms 
of ‘acceptable use’.  
 
In view of this, many NGOs argued for a more drastic approach in the GGE/CCW meetings 
and hoped to move the State Parties to the CCW towards a comprehensive ban on cluster 
munitions. At the same time they realised this was an uphill battle in view of the military, 
political and commercial interests that a number of possessor and producer states had in the 
continued and unhampered production and use of those controversial weapons.  
 
Preparatory steps towards the CMC 
At a meeting on ERWs organised by Pax Christi Ireland at Dublin in April 2003, the NGOs 
present expressed their concerns with regard to the lack of substantial progress on the 
GGE/CCW talks and opined that a joint NGO-effort was needed to address the humanitarian 
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problems caused by cluster munitions and ERWs. It was decided that a coalition would be 
formed to formulate a common view and to organise a campaign. An interim Steering 
Committee (SC), including Pax Christi Netherlands, was mandated to take the necessary 
preparatory steps for the launching of this coalition. It was decided to launch the coalition 
before the meeting of States Parties to the CCW scheduled for November 2003. PCN was 
appointed to organise the launch conference-cum-photo exhibition in the Netherlands. It was 
also envisaged to resolve during the launching conference several practical and managerial 
matters relating to the future functioning of the coalition. Pax Christi had requested funding 
from the Dutch government in support of the planned activities which was granted through a 
subsidy of € 95,0003. In the preparatory work leading to the launching conference the interim 
steering committee met seven times, often back-to-back to other conferences or meetings 
where the members were present.  
                                                 
3 There is no clarity on the exact amount. Parliamentary sources state that Pax Christi received € 
64,256 from the Dutch government for the EWR Cluster Munition campaign (Tweede Kamer, 2006-
2007, 30 800 V, p. 30).  
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3. LAUNCH AND ACTIVITIES OF CLUSTER MUNITION COALITION   
 
 
International Launch Conference 
On 13 November 2003 the official launch of the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) took place 
at the International Launch Conference in the ‘Grote Kerk’ in The Hague, the Netherlands by 
85 member organisations from 42 countries. The CMC had the following official call: 
 
 No use, production or trade of cluster munitions until the humanitarian problems 
associated with the weapons have been resolved; 
 Increased resources for assistance to communities and individuals affected by 
unexploded cluster munitions and all other explosive remnants of war; and 
 Users of cluster munitions and other munitions that have become ERW accept 
special responsibility for clearance, warnings and markings, risk education, provision 
of information and victim assistance. 
 
The CMC was founded to provide a coordinated, global response to the growing problems 
created by cluster munitions and other ERWs. The Coalition was open to all non-
governmental organisations that supported the aims, policy objectives and action programme 
of the coalition. It was governed by a ten-member Steering Committee (SC), including Pax 
Christi Netherlands. 
 
Apart from the official launch of the CMC per se, the participants at the International Launch 
Conference discussed campaigning and lobbying issues, including media, communication, 
technical and legal aspects of the cluster munition problem. The launch of the campaign was 
successful. As said, it attracted 85 participants from 42 countries and was opened by the 
Dutch Foreign Minister. The launch of the CMC was not only reported in the Dutch press, but 
also in a number of influential foreign newspapers.  
 
In the aftermath of the launch CMC prepared a funding proposal for 2004, in which it outlined 
its objectives, strategy and priorities, very much in line with the original mandate. It was 
argued that there was a need to appoint a full-time coordinator, this being the most 
immediate requirement for the further development of the CMC. Landmine Action UK offered 
to host the coordinator. Further it was decided to produce and distribute campaign materials, 
launch a website, and provide ‘humanitarian input’ to the CCW and other relevant 
international forums.   
 
2004: CMC action beyond Protocol V 
On 28 November 2003 more than 90 countries, including the United States (US), agreed to 
adopt Protocol V of the CCW. Though it was welcomed by NGO spoke-persons as a step 
forward compared to the lack of any instrument earlier, its text and many of its provisions 
were deemed weak. CMC argued that there was no clear user responsibility, a lack of 
retroactivity, and an absence of deadlines. Also no ban or moratorium on the use of cluster 
munitions was reached and its use was still permitted. However, at the same time talks of the 
GGE/CCW were scheduled to continue in 2004, and the GGE was tasked to “continue to 
consider the implementation of existing principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
and to further study … possible preventive measures aimed at improving the design of 
certain specific type of munitions, including sub-munitions, with a view to minimize the 
humanitarian risk of these munitions becoming explosive remnants of war. Exchange of 
information, assistance and cooperation would be part of this work.” CMC announced that it 
would continue to raise the issue of cluster munitions both within and outside the CCW.  
 
At the seventh session of the GGE held in Geneva from 8 till 12 March 2004, CMC delivered 
a statement and emphasised that the adoption of protocol V could only be considered a first 
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step of a much-needed, wider approach. CMC urged that a new protocol on sub-munitions 
be negotiated and that till that time State Parties take national steps. It demanded that stocks 
with high failure rates be destroyed, not only in view of humanitarian considerations but also 
due to military concerns. In the eighth session of the GGE/CCW held from 5-16 July 2004, 
CMC submitted a working paper ‘The Concerns about Sub-munitions from a Military 
Perspective’, including critical statements of military experts collected from military sources 
and recent reports on sub-munitions. CMC called for an immediate and permanent ban on 
those cluster munitions causing unjustifiable civilian suffering; a prohibition on the use of 
cluster munitions in or near populated areas; a clarification of international humanitarian law, 
as it applies to cluster munition; increased reliability and accuracy of cluster munitions; 
increased scrutiny of other factors associated with the use of cluster munitions, such as 
terrain, weather and drop altitude. Also Pax Christi delivered a statement, urging the GGE to 
support a separate legally binding protocol on cluster munitions.  
 
At the ninth GGE/CCW session, CMC submitted a paper ‘Dealing with the impact of cluster 
munitions’ that outlined the risks and problems of the use of cluster munitions and presented 
a number of recommendations to the State Parties as a minimum first step towards 
eliminating the humanitarian suffering caused by cluster munitions. PCN also delivered a 
statement to the GGE, asking attention to the resolution of the European Parliament (EP) 
(see below). CMC, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and several other NGOs expressed their 
disappointment about the lack of concrete results in the CCW framework. In an internal 
paper the CMC coordinator analysed the factors that thwarted progress, including the 
reluctance of the US to engage in deliberations that might affect its present use of weapons 
and the fact that China, Russia and others were not prepared to accept limits on the use or 
production of weapons that they were using or might wish to use in the future. For these 
countries any discussion on targeting and use of cluster munitions was problematic. They, at 
most, wanted to engage in a debate on the technical aspects of ERW (the ‘dud problem’), 
unlike the countries of the so-called like-minded group that were also prepared to discuss the 
targeting and use aspects as such. It was also observed in this paper that the 
disappointment of the like-minded group to achieve any tangible result might lead to a 
growing willingness to move outside the CCW. CMC decided to focus for 2005 more on 
national campaign meetings, and especially targeted Europe and like-minded countries. 
CMC also decided to adopt the tagline ‘Stop killing civilians’, next to ‘Stop using cluster 
munitions’ in order to capture all aspects of the problem adequately. In a briefing paper HRW 
highlighted a number of intermediate, but yet positive technical steps that could be taken at 
the national level to mitigate the negative humanitarian impact of cluster munitions. These 
included a shift to cluster munitions with a minimum sub-munition reliability rate, and the 
withdrawal and destruction of particularly damaging types of bombs. In some cases bombs 
could be retrofitted with self-destruct sub-munitions and thus made safer.  
  
European Parliament     
In cooperation with the Development Committee of the European Parliament, Pax Christi 
organised a hearing on cluster munitions and ERWs in the European Parliament on 6 
October 2004. This had been achieved in close cooperation with Dutch Euro-parliamentarian 
Max van den Berg who had called upon his colleagues and the Development Committee to 
facilitate such a hearing. This was subsequent to an earlier resolution by the EP and 
questions asked by several Euro-parliamentarians of different national and political 
backgrounds.  
 
As a follow-up of this hearing the EP adopted a resolution on cluster munitions and explosive 
remnants of war on 28 October 2004, calling for “an immediate moratorium on the use, 
stockpiling, production, transfer and export of cluster munitions, including air-dropped cluster 
munitions and sub-munitions delivered by missiles, rockets, and artillery projectiles, until an 
international agreement has been negotiated on the regulation, restriction or banning of 
these weapons”. The resolution also called for a mandate to negotiate a new protocol within 
 19 
the framework of the CCW. It also asked for adequate clearance and recording procedures 
and insisted that EU-troops should under no condition use cluster munitions till an 
international agreement has been negotiated.  
 
In the CMC SC-meeting on 12 November 2004 it was decided to continue to work for a new 
Protocol on cluster munitions at the CCW, but to focus increasingly on action outside the 
CCW, as the CCW was seen as ‘failing’ and ‘not seriously dealing with the problem’. In that 
same meeting Thomas Nash from Mines Action Canada was appointed as CMC coordinator 
on a voluntary basis till funding would have been secured for covering the costs involved. 
CMC SC members were asked to commit one day work per week to the CMC. A long list of 
tasks was defined and distributed, including establishing field contacts, gathering evidence, 
the development of campaign materials, the drafting of an institutional code, a website, and 
an update of the CMC leaflet. The total budget needed for the year 2005 was GBP 75,000. 
Land Mine Action had carried out a Global Impact Survey project in the period 2004-2005 for 
which it had received a subsidy of € 100,000 from the Dutch government.  
 
CMC strategy and activities in 2005  
CMC developed a strategy for 2005. One new element in the CMC strategy was research in 
order to collate existing evidence and to further document the cluster munitions problem and 
its use in affected countries. This also included surveys on government and military policy on 
cluster munitions. A second element was public education. It was argued that too few people 
understood the cluster munitions problem. CMC endeavoured to develop and disseminate 
key arguments and to support members with national meetings, debates, exhibitions and 
similar public events. CMC also wanted to organise side-events at the CCW and other UN 
and international meetings. A third component was a credible and evidence-based advocacy 
campaign focused on governments, ministers, CCW delegates and countries that were 
prepared to work outside the CCW. Finally, it was deemed essential to have an effective 
website. CMC also drafted a CMC Institutional Code of Conduct outlining the structure, 
responsibilities and procedures of the CMC. 
 
In the tenth session of the GGE/CCW in March 2005 preparatory steps were discussed for 
the Third Review Conference of the State Parties to the CCW, which was scheduled for 
2006. Pax Christi Netherlands asked attention in this session for a survey it was carrying out 
on the military utility of cluster weapons and asked the cooperation of the State Parties to the 
CCW to submit the answers of their governments to complete the draft working paper that 
was in progress. The United Kingdom submitted a paper on the ‘Military Utility of Cluster 
Munitions’ in the tenth session of the GGE/CCW meeting in which it reaffirmed its view that 
cluster munitions represent an essential capacity against area targets such as groups of 
vehicles. It committed itself at improving the technical aspects of sub-munitions. All sub-
munitions would contain a self-destruct mechanism by 2015 reducing their failure rate to less 
than 1%. Also Germany submitted a paper on the ‘Reliability and Use of Cluster Munitions’. 
Germany expressed its intention to use only cluster munitions with a limited operational time 
after deployment by including self-destruction or self-neutralizing mechanisms. The 
maximum ‘dud rate’ should be less than 1%. Cluster munitions that could not be adapted to 
that standard would not be used and phased out.  
 
In the eleventh session of the GGE/CCW, PCN presented its research study entitled ‘Cluster 
Weapons: Necessity or Convenience’. It contained an inventory of state policies and views 
with regard to the utility of cluster munitions. It further discussed related issues of non-
discrimination between combatants and civilians, the disproportionate harm caused relative 
to the military gains, and the reliability and accuracy of cluster munitions. The report 
distinguished different positions among the countries studied, corresponding to different 
possibilities and opportunities for lobby and reform.  
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CMC activities in 2006 
During the 14th session of the GGE/CCW held in Geneva in June 2006, HRW submitted a 
‘Survey of Cluster Munition Policy and Practice’ that provided an overview of states’ practice 
regarding cluster munitions, a timeline of the use of cluster munitions since 1943, and 
country profiles of states owning stockpiles of cluster munitions. The survey also revealed 
that at least twelve countries had transferred over fifty types of cluster munitions to at least 
fifty-eight other countries. On the other hand, it also mentioned countries that had taken 
positive steps to address humanitarian concerns by national legislation and / or removing 
munitions with high failure rates. With regard to principles of IHL, the report asserted that 
current national implementation was inadequate and that additional measures were required. 
HRW argued for a new cluster munition-specific mandate for the GGE/CCW with a view to 
negotiate a new protocol addressing cluster munitions following the 2006 CCW Review 
Conference. It argued in addition, that the vast majority of existing stockpiles should never be 
used, as these posed unacceptable risks to civilians, either during strikes, post-conflict or 
both, due to their inaccuracy and unreliability. 
 
A positive development in the meantime was the adoption of a law by Belgium on 6 February 
2006 prohibiting the production, stockpiling, transfer, trade, export or use of cluster 
munitions. It ordered the destruction of available stocks in Belgium before 9 June 2009. 
Norway announced a moratorium in June 2006.   
 
The use of cluster munitions in the Israel-Hezbollah war 
According to HRW both Israel and Hezbollah used cluster munitions in the war in South 
Lebanon that raged between 12 July and 14 August 2006 (Volkskrant 2006). The use of 
cluster munitions in this war raised intense international attention and outrage. HRW and UN 
mine-experts declared that Israel had used cluster munitions on populated civilian areas in 
South Lebanon. The UN confirmed 366 individual cluster strike sites. On 3 August 2006 Pax 
Christi International (PCI) submitted a written statement to the UN Sub-commission for the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in which it expressed serious concern about the 
violence used in Gaza and South Lebanon. It asked the committee to denounce all attacks 
from all sides on civilians and civilian infrastructure and to call for a stop to the use of cluster 
munitions and phosphor bombs, being ‘inacceptable, inaccurate and unreliable weapons’.  
 
A detailed study presented by four UN experts to the UN Human Rights Council concluded 
that there had been major violations of human rights and international humanitarian law on 
both sides of the conflict. The report concluded that civilian targets had been hit and that 
1191 people had been killed in Lebanon and 4,405 wounded of which one-third children. In 
Israel Hezbollah rockets killed 75 people with hundreds of persons wounded. Hundreds of 
thousands of people were displaced at both sides of the border. The experts specifically 
mentioned the impact of cluster bomblets, of which Israel reportedly dropped about one 
million. According to UN figures, 12 persons were killed, among which three children, and 44 
injured by unexploded cluster munitions after the ceasefire.  
 
Disillusionment at the 2006 CCW Review Conference 
In the run-up to the CCW Review Conference, held in November 2006, several international 
NGOs stepped up their campaigns by organising meetings, producing studies and screening 
films that showed the impact of cluster munitions. At the start of the conference about thirty-
five CMC campaigners distributed flyers.  
 
At the opening of the 2006 Review Conference United Nations, UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan called for an immediate freeze on the use of cluster mention in armed conflicts, while 
UN Under-Secretary-General Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan 
Egeland also called on the State Parties to do so during a press conference in New York. 
Though during the Review Conference, on 13 November 2006, Protocol V entered into force, 
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it became clear than a growing amount of states were in favour of a new instrument on 
cluster munitions, due to the perceived inadequacy of Protocol V. There was a sizeable 
presence of NGOs at the conference. The CMC members gave mutually coordinated 
presentations on different problematic aspects of cluster munitions. Moreover, 
representatives from Afghanistan and Lebanon presented the experiences from countries 
affected by cluster munitions. All this led to considerable media attention, both in major 
European newspapers and on TV in Italy and the UK. 
 
However, despite all efforts, yet expectably, it was not possible to come at the Review 
Conference to a conclusion desired by the CMC and some progressive like-minded 
countries. It was, nevertheless, a notable fact that over thirty State Parties were in favour of a 
new negotiating mandate for the CCW and that this group, led by Norway, undertook the 
initiative to start the so-called Oslo Process, aimed at an internationally binding convention 
against cluster munitions causing unacceptable suffering among civilians. The Oslo Process 
was conspicuous in the sense that the states involved had decided to continue their efforts 
outside the CCW framework, which was deemed completely ineffectual.   
 
The Oslo Process 
In February 2007 a first meeting was organised in Oslo and 46 states subscribed to the aim 
of a prohibition of cluster munitions. Whereas initially 38 states had been invited, others 
came on their own, including The Netherlands. The states present committed themselves to 
conclude by 2008 a legally binding international instrument that would prohibit the use, 
production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions causing unacceptable harm to 
civilians, and that would establish a framework for cooperation and assistance to survivors. 
They also would consider national steps and continue to address the humanitarian 
challenges of cluster munitions within the framework of international humanitarian law and all 
relevant forums. Follow-up conferences were announced in Lima, Wellington, Vienna and 
Dublin with regional conferences planned in between. The follow-up conference in Lima from 
23-25 May 2007 was attended by 68 countries. Several aspects of the problem were 
discussed with the host Peru following the format of the Ottowa anti-personnel mine ban 
treaty. No official declarations were made or texts negotiated at this conference.  
 
On 23 October 2007 the European Parliament adopted a resolution supporting the Oslo 
Process and calling for a comprehensive ban on cluster munitions. 
 
The next meeting in the framework of the Oslo Process was held in Vienna from 5-7 
December 2007. It was attended by delegates from 138 countries. On 5 December UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon called for a prohibition on cluster munitions that cause 
unacceptable harm to civilians. CMC had come to Vienna with 140 civil society delegates 
from fifty different countries in support of the process who actively lobbied and distributed 
relevant information. A significant contribution was the report ‘M85 – An analysis of reliability’ 
that refuted the often used argument by possessor states that cluster munitions with self-
destruct mechanisms or lower failure rates would not harm civilians and hence should not be 
banned. ICRC as the guardian of international humanitarian law stated that the vast majority 
of cluster munitions and, in fact, all cluster munitions used to date, had been inaccurate and 
unreliable.  
 
NGOs at the meeting in Vienna stressed the value of a partnership between civil society, 
international organisations, parliamentarians and governments. Detailed preparatory work 
had been carried out on victim assistance provisions, clearance and stockpile destruction 
and the issue of the definition. It was asserted that a strongest possible ban treaty was 
desirable that would imply far reaching obligations on the basis of the clearest and most 
precise provisions possible. The burden of proof for any exemptions would completely rest 
on user governments. CMC had prepared itself thoroughly by formulating a detailed, nine-
page, lobby guide and a questions-and-answers sheet for media work. 
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In Wellington 103 states met again from 18-22 February 2008 and decided to forward a draft 
text for the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) to the Diplomatic Conference to be held 
in Dublin from 19 till 30 May 2008. They reaffirmed the wish to conclude a legally binding 
instrument prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. They also 
agreed, as a compromise, to forward alternative text proposals contained in a compendium 
attached to the Wellington Declaration, but these were not deemed to have the same status 
as the draft text.  
 
In the run-up to the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions from 19-30 May, 
CMC prepared a detailed action plan for civil society outreach, publicity, events and lobby. 
CMC also produced a lobbying guide and a participant handbook and a set of policy papers 
on thirteen major subjects of interest to the Conference.  
 
In the Dublin Conference 107 states, including the Netherlands, adopted the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions. Though some major owner and producer states, including Russia, China, 
the US and Israel, did not take part, the number of states attending was much higher than 
expected and also included states that earlier were not in favour of the Convention or 
supported a much weaker text. During the conference, many detailed and often technical 
discussions took place on definitions and texts of specific articles and provisions. NGOs like 
HRW and International Human Rights Clinic, Austcare and Handicap International provided 
technical inputs on such issues as the legal process of joining and implementing the CCM, 
sensor-fuzing and smart sub-munitions, and interoperability and the prohibition on 
assistance. There was a close relationship and working contacts between the CMC partners 
and delegations of like-minded countries. In the meetings of the Dublin conference CMC 
partners were offered to opportunity to raise issues and submit proposals. Though CMC was 
disappointed about article 21 (interoperability), it was enthusiastic about the CCM as a 
whole. The CCM had become a comprehensive treaty with a strong definition and a 
groundbreaking article on victim assistance. 
 
In the meantime the continued relevance of a comprehensive prohibition was shown by the 
use of cluster munitions in the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia. Both sides were 
accused of having used cluster munitions, leading to at least seventeen casualties and 
dozens of wounded, according to HRW. Tragically, also the Dutch journalist Stan Storimans 
was killed in one of those cluster bomb attacks, as was confirmed by the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs after a forensic investigation.  
 
As a preparation to the signing conference in Oslo to be held on 2 and 3 December 2008, 
regional conferences were held in Bulgaria, Uganda, Ecuador, Lao and Vietnam in the 
autumn of 2008. CMC provided guidance to the Oslo Process by submitting a definition of 
cluster munition for the convention and by formulating 19 treaty principles. Before the Dublin 
conference, CMC had already formulated an internal action plan to promote the Rapid Entry 
into Force (EIF) of the CCM. This included targeting countries to sign and after that rapidly 
ratify the CCM. It was intended that at least 123 states would sign the convention in Oslo, 
surpassing the 122 states that had signed Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) in Ottowa in 1997. A 
variety of tools, activities and resources was used, mainly drawing on the human resources 
of the global coalition of CMC members. Special attention was devoted to affected countries, 
the use of the ‘Ban Advocates’ team of cluster munition survivors, and a ‘ban bus’. 
Campaigning materials (including eye-catching stickers, bumper stickers and badges) and 
lobby tools were developed, including the use of new media such as blogs, facebook, film 
clips and other visual resources. On the CMC website there was a slide show, a ready-to-use 
powerpoint presentation and YouTube videos, and downloadable survivor stories. In 
addition, disinvestment campaigns were highlighted as a tool to draw attention to the issue 
and pressurise governments. In October 2008 a Global Week of Action was planned 
emphasising the need for all countries to sign. Together with the Dublin conference this 
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would be used as the main media moment and run till the opening of the signing conference 
in Oslo. Religious leaders were approached to encourage their respective governments to 
sign. CMC further identified a multitude of international, multilateral and other agencies that 
were to be mobilised in favour of signing and ratification. The action extended toward the 
global public as well by introducing the notion of the People’s Treaty that could be signed on 
internet (see box 3). 
 
Box 3: Sign the People’s Treaty 
Cluster bombs cause predictable and unacceptable harm to civilians, both at the time of use and for 
many years after. It is my strong belief that these weapons are morally unacceptable. 
I fully support the new international treaty on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, transfer, and 
production of cluster bombs. 
Through their signature and ratification of this treaty, governments will legally commit themselves 
not only to ban cluster bombs, but also to clear contaminated land and provide assistance to victims 
and affected communities. 
Through my signature on the People's Treaty, I commit to work to ensure that governments live up to 
their obligations. 
During a CMC SC retreat in New York in September 2008 further operational details were 
discussed and tasks divided. It was also discussed that after the EIF of the CCM there would 
be a need to monitor its implementation. Several institutional modalities were discussed as 
how to do this, especially in view of the commonalities and differences between the CCM 
and MBT, and the potential relationship between CMC and the ICBL.  
 
On 2-4 December 2008 Norway hosted the Oslo Signing Conference for the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions, attended by 122 states. A total of 94 states signed the Convention in Oslo 
in front of a CMC delegation of 250 campaigners, including The Netherlands. The ministers 
of Foreign Affairs of St. Vincent and the Grenadines and of Cyprus signed the CCM on 23 
September 2009 in New York, being the 99th and 100th signatory respectively. France and 
Burundi ratified the CCM on 25 September 2009, bringing the total number of ratifications at 
21. At the moment of writing this report the number of ratifications had increased to 23. 
   
Rear-guard actions in the GGE/CCW 
In the meantime during meetings of the GGE/CCW in 2007 and 2008, work started on a 
mandate to formulate a new protocol and on the drafting of the protocol itself. However, from 
the beginning there were wide-spread doubts and scepticism whether the CCW would be 
able to arrive at any meaningful result. NGO representatives characterised the mandate for 
negotiations as not serious and credible. It was evident that there was serious dissent 
between the State Parties on the text in terms of definitions, provisions and articles. The 
compromise text therefore contained all types of exemptions and had an open transition 
period. It in effect did not ban cluster munitions, but only regulated them, permitting 
continued use. CMC characterised the result as weak, inadequate and unacceptable. 
Compared to the CCM, the protocol did not add anything significant and, in fact, provided a 
lower standard, even though it could still be useful for (limited) national initiatives, especially 
of those countries that were not part of the CCM. It became clear that the CCM and the Oslo 
Process had gradually completely overshadowed the work of the GGE/CCW that had 
increasingly manoeuvred itself into a position of irrelevance in the wider global context.   
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A life after the CCM 
Having reached its major goal of a comprehensive ban on cluster munitions, CMC refocused 
its efforts on universal adherence of the CCM, on its rapid EIF and the monitoring of 
compliance. It rephrased its goals and strategic objectives as follows:  
“The CMC’s goal is to protect civilians from the effects of cluster munitions. The CMC has a 
number of strategic objectives to achieve this goal:  
1. To promote universal adherence to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the 
emerging global norm against the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of cluster 
munitions  
2. To promote the maximum number of signatures to and ratifications of the Convention 
in the shortest possible time to ensure its rapid entry into force  
3. To promote effective implementation of and full compliance with the Convention by 
States Parties, and compatible steps by non-States Parties, and to ensure effective 
monitoring of all such efforts by civil society  
4. To raise public awareness of the harm to civilians caused by cluster munitions and 
efforts made by civil society and concerned states to eliminate this harm”. 
Till the moment of writing this report national and international activities to reach those 
strategic objectives continue. CMC’s work got international recognition by being given the 
Tipperary International Peace Award on 1 May 2009. On 29 May 2009 Human Rights Watch, 
Landmine Action, Landmine Monitor, the ICBL and CMC published the report ‘Banning 
Cluster Munitions’ that not only described the successes of the past, but also outlined future 
challenges. The 288-page report contained a government policy and practice analysis with 
entries on 150 countries. It called upon the countries that so far did not sign the CCM, to do 
so. It also marked the kick-off of the ‘Global Week of Action against Cluster Bombs’. In 
August 2009 the CMC commemorated the victims that fell due to the use cluster munitions in 
South Lebanon and Georgia. 
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4. PCN ACTIVITIES IN THE NETHERLANDS 
 
Most of the time and energy devoted by IPCN went into active participation in the SC, 
attending several meetings a year, attending all Oslo-related conferences and, moreover, 
through many emails with the SC members deciding on the strategy and policy of the CMC.  
 
Apart from its participation in the CMC SC, Pax Christi was also active in the Netherlands. 
Here, in 2003 the Dutch Cluster Munition Coalition was formed comprising IPCN, Oxfam 
Novib, Stichting Vluchteling, UNICEF, Campagne tegen Wapenhandel and Amnesty. (I)PCN 
acted as coordinator and spokes-person of the Dutch CMC. The Dutch partners collaborated 
and, individually or together, approached Dutch politicians and the press. The creation of 
broad societal support and advocacy was deemed essential. PCN for example approached 
the Dutch Bishops’ Conference and the Representative of the Holy See in Geneva. PCN also 
continued to promote the use of the photo-exhibition developed for the CMC Launch 
Conference elsewhere. It was used by several NGOs as well as in Denmark, Ireland and 
Germany respectively. In 2005 PCN developed a specific proposal to carry out a ‘Stop 
Cluster Munition Campaign’ to be carried out in 2005-2006. The proposal comprised many 
ideas for public awareness raising and lobby activities as well as an educational campaign 
focused at schools, universities and specific target groups like members of parliament (MP), 
press and volunteer groups. Expectably, a major target group for policy influence was the 
Dutch government. The proposal also included a research into financial links between Dutch 
banks and producers of cluster munitions.  
 
Political lobby 
On 29 August 2006 PCN wrote a letter to spoke-persons of the major political parties in 
Dutch parliament, pleading for an immediate moratorium on the production, trade and use of 
cluster weapons. It urged The Netherlands to call for a new negotiating mandate in the 
GGE/CCW, while The Netherlands should destroy its stocks of old cluster munitions. With 
regard to the situation in South Lebanon PCN called for assistance to the authorities in 
clearing and destroying the ERWs. This would also require full cooperation and transparency 
from Israel. Finally, PCN asked for an independent investigation into the use of cluster 
munitions by Israel. On 11 October 2006 PCN together with six other NGOs organised a 
hearing at The Hague and presented a joint declaration to Dutch politicians in the run-up to 
the CCW Review Conference. The declaration stressed the need for a new international 
instrument to stop cluster munitions and reiterated the demands made earlier by the CMC. 
The meeting was well attended, with the main interest from MPs from the opposition parties. 
The ruling Christian-democratic party –CDA – was conspicuously absent.  
 
In the parliamentary budget discussions in October 2006, several parliamentarians asked 
questions to the Dutch government on the issue of cluster munitions. An overview of 
parliamentary questions and motions between 1999 and 2006 showed that questions on 
cluster munitions were posed on nine occasions in Parliament and that three motions had 
been submitted. They originated from respectively the Socialist Party, the Social Democrats 
and the Greens. However, none of the motions received a majority in Parliament. The Dutch 
government replied that it considered cluster bombs legitimate and therefore was not 
prepared considering a moratorium. It stressed that if such weapons were used by The 
Netherlands, they would comply with international humanitarian law principles. The 
government added that The Netherlands would undertake efforts in international forums to 
sharpen the technical criteria for cluster munitions, e.g. to reduce the ‘dud rate’ and thus 
decrease the humanitarian risk of those weapons. 
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IPCN urged the Dutch authorities to participate in the first Oslo meeting and was afterwards 
in frequent contact with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to a lesser extent with the 
Ministry of Defense.. 
 
The Netherlands joined indeed the Oslo Process in February 2007. But although   
The Netherlands participated in the Oslo Process from the outset, it made clear its 
preference for the CCW, and frequently expressed reservations about the Oslo process and 
the draft convention text, particularly the notion of a comprehensive ban. On 18 March 2007, 
considerable public outcry was generated when Dutch television aired a documentary titled 
“The Clusterbomb Feeling,” wich exposed major Dutch pension funds’ investments in 
companies involved in the production of landmines and cluster munitions. Many pension 
funds subsequently announced their intention to end investments in cluster munitions 
manufacturers. IPCN supported this documentary and sent around letters to the pension 
fund PGGM and requested its members to approach their pension fund as well. A report with 
recommendations was written on PGGM and clusterbombs. This was discussed with the 
Labour Union FNV and PGGM itself. 
 
In April 2007, Krista van Velzen of the Socialist Party submitted a private member’s bill to the 
Council of State forbidding the use, stockpiling, transfer and production of cluster munitions. 
However, the bill was not discussed in Parliament before the Dublin negotiations in May 
2008. IPCN supported MP Van Velzen in this and commented several times on it. 
 
During the Lima conference in May 2007, the Netherlands stated that it was not in favor of a 
comprehensive ban on cluster munitions. When the Norwegian chair introduced the Oslo 
Declaration on 23 February, The Dutch Ambassador stated that: ”Our aim is to ban a certain 
part of the universe of cluster munitions .… The objective of Oslo is not to ban an entire 
category of weapons.” The Netherlands continued to emphasize the CCW as the preferred 
environment for work on this issue. 
 
Due to the ambiguous position of the Netherlands and the need for a strong definition of 
cluster munitions that should be banned, IPCN decided in Lima to strengthen its campaign in 
The Netherlands. With support of the SP and the Social Democrats IPCN organised on 27 
June 2007 a parliamentary discussion meeting (‘algemeen overleg’; AO) for which IPCN 
invited military expert Collin King, HRW expert Marc Hiznay, CMC coordinator Thomas Nash, 
survivor Bralislav Kapetanovic and also IPCN spoke. MoD invited military specialist Goense 
and Major Van Kappen. On 26 June 2007, one day before that meeting took place, the 
Ministry of Defense announced a temporary suspension of the use of cluster munitions, 
stating that the military would not use cluster munitions until further notice.  Henceforth, the 
Parliament would be notified in a timely manner in the event cluster munitions were to be 
used. IPCN reacted quickly by a press release (that was picked up widely) stating that the 
Ministry’s position was still ambiguous, as it did not take a clear and firm stance on any of the 
contested issues and kept, in fact, all possibilities open. It maintained in the Oslo Process its 
original position, very much similar to the one taken in the GGE/CCW and CCW Review 
Conference. IPCN was able to explain this in detail at a prime TV news programme ‘Eén 
Vandaag’ that same day. 
 
In September 2007 during the Global Week of Action, IPCN (together with the other Dutch 
members of the CMC) put an advertisement in three major Dutch newspapers through which 
it asked the public to take a stance against cluster munitions. 
 
IPCN with four other NGOs urged Dutch Parliament to devote a special debate to the issue 
of Dutch cluster munitions which took place on 7 October 2007. In a letter to the Dutch MPs 
they asserted that the Netherlands lacked a clear position and did not play a significant role 
in the Oslo Process. The NGOs urged that the Netherlands play a more protagonist role in 
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the process towards the prohibition of cluster munitions and also take (unilateral) national 
steps.  
 
In the years 2007 and 2008 Dutch MPs posed a large number of questions to the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs and Defence with regard to their position in the GGE/CCW and the Oslo 
Process, and on the technical interpretation of the reliability and accuracy of cluster 
munitions. In the parliamentary committees on Foreign Affairs and on Defense a total of 76 
questions were asked by the MPs to the government. It was clear that the viewpoints, inputs 
and lobby of CMC had contributed significantly to the wording and framing of those 
questions, next to the role of conspicuous events such as the war in South Lebanon and 
Georgia. With regard to political lobby, it seems that IPCN had more traction with opposition 
parties than with parties from the government. A very active key role in the debates was 
played by SP MP Ms. van Velzen and also by social-democratic MP Ms. Eijsink. After a 
change of government in 2007, IPCN got some better access to the major confessional 
party, the Christian-democrats, who (together with the government) moved slowly in the 
direction of the Oslo Process.     
 
At the same time IPCN also maintained good relations with the civil servants of both the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. Those contacts had improved due to IPCN’s 
presence at the GGE/CCW as well as the conferences in the Oslo Process, with regular 
briefings and exchanges with the head of the Dutch delegations. It also helped that IPCN 
involved reputed Dutch military experts in its campaigns that were able to raise confidence 
and a certain level of receptivity within especially the Ministry of Defense. 
 
At the Vienna conference in December 2007, the Netherlands stated, “Since that ‘founding 
meeting’ of the Oslo Group the discussion papers tabled at the follow-on meetings in Lima 
and Vienna have drifted away from [the] original aim” of the Oslo Process: to ban those 
cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm. The Netherlands argued that the proposed 
draft convention text implied “a ban on all future types of cluster munitions, whose 
characteristics are as yet unknown but may include types that do not cause unacceptable 
harm to civilians and hence do not have to be banned.” The Netherlands argued for 
exceptions for cluster munitions with low failure rates and self-destruct mechanisms, and for 
cluster munitions containing fewer than 10 sub-munitions. The Netherlands also proposed 
the inclusion of a specific article on the relationship of a future treaty with existing 
international instruments, mentioning CCW Protocol V. 
 
As Dutch MP’s and media were under the impression that the Dutch government was 
lobbying for a strong treaty and IPCN noticed a more negative stance of The Netherlands at 
the several Oslo conferences, it decided to write a report. This report ‘The Devil is in the 
Detail’, gives a detailed description of the Dutch position and was widely distributed.  
 
During the Wellington conference in February 2008, the Netherlands aligned itself with the 
so-called like-minded group that put forward numerous proposals that the CMC sharply 
criticized as weakening the draft text. In addition to continuing to oppose a broad prohibition, 
the Netherlands supported the deletion of special obligations for past users of cluster 
munitions. It endorsed a discussion paper calling for provisions aimed at facilitating 
’interoperability’ (joint military operations with states that were not party to the Convention). It 
supported a new provision allowing retention of cluster munitions for training and research 
purposes. At the conclusion of the conference, the Netherlands associated itself with a 
statement made on behalf of the like-minded group declaring dissatisfaction with the 
conference as it felt different opinions and views had not been taken into account in a 
balanced way. The Netherlands itself criticized ’an unnecessary polarization’. However, it 
announced it would subscribe to the Wellington Declaration, indicating its intention to 
participate fully in the Dublin negotiations on the basis of the Wellington draft text. 
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In April 2008, the Ministry of Defense in collaboration with national research bodies reported 
on an inquiry into precision and reliability as criteria by which to distinguish “acceptable” from 
“unacceptable” cluster munitions. They concluded that reliability rates of weapons depend on 
the context and are therefore difficult to ascertain. On this basis, the government decided it 
was preferable to use technical properties, such as the presence of self-destruction and self-
neutralization mechanisms and the number of sub-munitions.  
 
In April 2008 IPCN intensified its campaign again through the media and by launching a 
signature action asking the Dutch government to go for a comprehensive ban (and thus 
destroy both the M261 and the CBU 87 types that it owned). Pressure was put on MoD as 
former military commander Patrick Cammaert and former minister and former UNSG Special 
Representative to Sudan Jan Pronk who was now chairman of ICPN, signed the petition 
publicly at the Africa Day organised by the Labour Party. Furthermore, signatures were 
collected at universities, at Liberation Day festivals, and a day organised by the Socialist 
Party etc. Nevertheless, defense minister Van Middelkoop kept stating that the Dutch 
government would consider giving up only the CBU 87, but not the M261. IPCN approached 
Adessium for extra funds and started a campaign two weeks before Dublin started with many 
radio commercials that featured a military expert and Bishop Van Luyn calling upon the 
Dutch government to go for a total ban, news articles, radio interviews etc. IPCN made a 
DVD on the need for a comprehensive ban and this DVD was send to all MP’s with the 
specific request to ask their colleagues not to accept a weak position of the Netherlands. 
Bishop Van Luyn sent a letter to Prime Minister Balkenende and though IPCN’s network 
many MPs were approached. IPCN called upon these MPs to ask Minister Van Middelkoop 
and Verhagen for strong instructions for Dublin, but without success. IPCN asked for another 
parliamentary discussion meeting (AO) on cluster munitions and this request in the end was 
respected on May 15th (two days before Dublin started).  
  
On that day IPCN organised a publicity and awareness event with Dutch parliamentarians 
and spokespersons at the Plein in The Hague, where mock cluster sub-munitions were 
exploded with real audio-effects. MPs from the Christian-Democrats, the Social-Democrats , 
the Greens and the Socialist Party helped cleaning up the square of unexploded duds and 
were interviewed afterwards. Despite the media attention the outcome of the AO was 
negative and Minister Van Middelkoop kept to his position that cluster munitions were 
essential for the Dutch military and that a total ban was not desired by the Dutch 
government.  
 
During the Dublin Diplomatic Conference in May 2008, the Netherlands increased its 
emphasis on interoperability, arguing that a solution to this would be vital to achieving 
consensus. It said that the Netherlands would not be able to join a convention which would 
affect its choice of military partners. The Netherlands proposed that the convention should 
employ a three tier approach to prohibition, including exemptions for munitions with a limited 
number of sub-munitions; a middle range of cluster munitions which would be subject to 
cumulative requirements; and a bottom tier of a “massive number” of cluster munitions which  
would be subjected to prohibition outright. On 22 May, however, the Lower House of the 
Netherlands’ Parliament accepted a parliamentary motion for a comprehensive ban on 
cluster munitions, submitted by social-democrat MP Eijsink. This motion was also supported 
by the Christian-Democrats, something which had become a key target for IPCN in the first 
half of 2008. The motion called on the Netherlands to pursue the strongest treaty possible in 
Dublin, and played an important role in a shift of Dutch policy in Dublin toward a more 
constructive approach and greater willingness to accept key elements of the draft text.  
 
During the run-up to the Dublin conference IPCN attracted a lot of media attention, on radio 
as well as in prime time television programmes such as NOVA and Den Haag Vandaag. The 
same happened again during the signing conference in Oslo. 
 
 29 
During the year 2009 the attention shifted to the rapid signing and ratification of the CCM. In 
the Global Week Of Action Against Cluster Bombs from 29 May till 4 June 2009, IKV Pax 
Christi, Oxfam Novib, UNICEF, Stichting Vluchteling, Amnesty International and the 
Campagne tegen Wapenhandel presented letters to the embassies of Cyprus, Estonia, 
Finland, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slowakia, Turkey and the US and called upon 
those states to sign the CCM. All these countries were European Union members or 
Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies that had not yet signed the CCM.  
   
Disinvestment campaign  
IPCN had built up a certain niche with regard to this issue of disinvestment in cluster 
munitions production and trade. In a letter to the Dutch Minister of Finance IPCN raised the 
role of Dutch banks in the funding of companies involved in arms trade to countries with an 
arms embargo or of companies that produced cluster munitions. A documentary ‘Het 
Clusterbomgevoel’ by the programme Zembla on Dutch television on 18 March 2007 showed 
that several major Dutch pension funds invested in companies involved in the production of 
cluster munitions. The programme led to public commotion and resulted in a multitude of 
articles in the written press. IPCN had provided inputs in the documentary and, more 
importantly, used the momentum by co-publishing and promoting a report ‘Pensioengeld 
voor wapengeweld’, while actively engaging in discussion with Dutch pension funds and 
labour unions. This led to a further focus on social corporate responsibility and increased 
transparency. It also induced a sharpened policy by several pension funds that started to 
exclude tainted companies from their portfolios, though some others refused to take any 
action. In May 2008 the Campaign against Arms Trade published an interim report providing 
an overview of the policies and investments of the pension funds with regard to the 
production and trade in arms, including cluster munitions.  
 
With regard to The Netherlands the CMC demanded a strong Dutch legislation, including a 
prohibition on investments in cluster munitions ex art. 1C CCM. In a ‘Guide toward fair 
banking’ and on the basis of research by IPCN, it was proven that several major Dutch banks 
and insurance companies still continued to invest in firms producing or facilitating cluster 
munitions producers, including Aegon, ING, Rabobank en SNS Reaal. CMC also wanted that 
the Dutch take a critical and non-supportive position vis-à-vis allies that still use cluster 
munitions. In October 2009 IPCN and Netwerk Vlaanderen published a major research 
document into the role of banks, insurance and investment agencies in the funding or 
assistance of cluster munitions producers or traders. It presents a state-of-the-art report on 
financial institutions' investment in companies that develop or produce cluster munitions (Hall 
of Shame), on financial institutions disinvesting from producers of cluster munitions (Hall of 
Fame and Runners-Up) and on legislative measures to prohibit investment in cluster 
munitions. Although the Convention on Cluster Munitions does not explicitly prohibit 
investments in cluster munitions, the prohibition on assistance that is included in art 1c of the 
convention should prevent states from investments in cluster munitions producers. Financing 
and investing are active choices, based on a clear assessment of a company and its plans. 
Investing in a cluster munitions producer therefore is a choice to support the production of 
these weapons that cause unacceptable harm. The report highlights both the good practices 
of financial institutions and states, as well as points out the financial institutions that are still 
investing in cluster munitions. The report contains clear recommendations for states and 
financial institutions that all come down to one message: stop explosive investments now 
(Vandenbroucke and Boer 2009).  
 
Funding and human resources  
The total cost for activities in relation to the cluster munition campaign has been calculated at 
€ 345,367 for the period 2003-2009, or on average € 49,338 per year. In addition ICPN had 
to spend monies for the salaries of the staff involved in the campaign. The total investment 
has been for 6.4 full-time equivalents (FTEs) or about 0.9 FTE per year on average. Due to 
changes in personnel over the years it was not possible to estimate the exact expenditure 
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spent, but it is safe that this average would not exceed € 50,000 per year against current 
costs, incl. employers’ fees. In 2003 PCN received a subsidy of € 95,000 from the Dutch 
government for organising the International Launch Conference in The Hague. In October 
2007 IPCN submitted a funding request to Adessium for an amount € 45,000 to sponsor their 
lobby efforts for an international treaty. In 2008 Adesssium sponsored IPCN again with an 
additional € 67,700 for a media and public campaign towards the Dublin conference. Later on 
additional funding was acquired from Adassium bringing their sponsoring for this purpose at 
a total of € 160,000. It was noted that without this support IPCN would not have been able to 
launch its campaign with the external professional inputs and with the size and scale it was 
able to do thanks to this sponsoring. Considering the results, it can be said that the campaign 
has been carried out with minimal financial resources and a limited input of personnel from 
the Dutch side. Though the results at the international level cannot, of course, be attributed 
exclusively to ICPN and also included the efforts of other international partners, IPCN was 
nevertheless an important partner and contributor to the overall CMC campaign, next to its 
own achievement at the national level in The Netherlands. 
 
 
Table 1 Resources used for cluster munition campaign 2003-2009                 
 
 Activities Personnel in FTEs 
2003  €                  40,598  0.5 
2004  €                  35,078  1.0 
2005  €                  15,445  1.0 
2006  €                  17,486  0.8 
2007  €                  40,015  0.8 
2008  €                116,745  1.1 
  2009  €                  89,000  1.2 
Total €                  345,367 6.4 
 
  
The human resources available were participating in CMC international as well as in lobby 
and publicity work nationally. The dossier of the cluster munitions is fairly specialist and 
required up to date knowledge both in terms of technical know-how as with regard to the 
diplomatic and political developments. Within this demanding domain they were again 
specialising on the issue of disinvestment which had become a niche that IPCN was 
developing both within the CMC framework as more generally. All this can be seen as a 
considerable achievement in view of the limited human resources available.   
 
Understandably staff seemed sometimes overwhelmed by the pressure to act on immediate 
events. This was partly due to the unpredictability of the larger developments, such as in the 
Oslo process, and the inherent difficulty to arrive at a proper long-term planning. Such 
planning could have guaranteed that extra personnel could have been mobilised when 
needed or that those could be hired from outside, as was done in 2008 for designing a 
professional publicity campaign. There is some scope for improvement here, as well as with 
regard to the communication and division of tasks between different IPCN departments, 
including the department of Communications and Campaigns. The exigencies and pressures 
involved in this type of work require regular communication and a clear articulation of 
expectations, possibilities and limitations. 
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5. DISCUSSION 
 
 
Below I shall discuss the findings under a number of headings as derived from the literature 
on advocacy evaluation by Chapman and Wameyo (2001) and Kelly (2002) in the 
Introduction.  
 
Vision, objectives, strategy, and framing of the intervention 
 
The CMC was set up on the basis of the experiences of its members in the ongoing difficult, 
slow and frustrating discussion in the GGE/CWW, as well as on the basis of a series of 
studies and reports that were published in the late 1990s and early 2000s on the issue of 
cluster bombs. Several of those reports discussed the use of those munitions in NATO’s 
actions in Yugoslavia and Kosovo. There was a strong feeling among the NGOs convening 
at a meeting in Dublin in 2003 that it was of the essence to join efforts to gain momentum 
and break through the impasse that seemed to prevail in the official talks. The example of the 
MBT and a resolution in Norwegian Parliament urging the government to achieve an 
international ban on cluster munitions provided a much needed stimulus and 
encouragement. 
 
Though there was no strategy paper prepared in advance (such as was the case in ECOS), 
the envisaged coalition harnessed skilfully the experiences from its members and formed an 
interim steering committee mandated to prepare the establishment of the CMC. The SC was 
able to move things quickly and organise an International Launch Conference the same year. 
It was decided to have a light formal or, perhaps in fact, an informal structure without legal 
identity, based on a coordinator and a SC of ten members. This structure continued to 
function throughout the period studied, though support staff increased over the years as the 
campaign intensified and reached seven full-time staff in the CMC office in London by 2008, 
in addition to staff attached to individual CMC members. Leadership evolved gradually from 
one coordinator to a structure with three co-chairs that provided leadership: Human Rights 
Watch (Mr. Steve Goose); Landmine Action (Mr. Richard Moyes); and Norwegian People’s 
Aid (Ms. Grethe Østern). 
 
The vision, strategy, and program logic evolved in response to the situation encountered in 
reality and in policy practice. Whereas in the beginning the focus was still largely on the 
negotiations in the framework of the GGE/CWW, it began to shift away from this official 
setting towards a broader societal involvement and alternative avenues outside this 
framework in later years. This was in response to own experiences gained within the 
coalition with respect to its participation as an observer in the GGE/CCW, but was also 
propelled by external events, such as the use of cluster munitions in ongoing conflicts 
offering an opening for political lobby and societal awareness-raising. In addition, there were 
shifts in the position of progressive, ‘like-minded’ states that increasingly became open to the 
viewpoints of the coalition and ultimately were even prepared to operate outside the CCW 
framework. This was a dialectic process, as this development was partly the result of CMC’s 
own work and the evidence-based inputs it provided to the ongoing debate. 
 
The shift from a CCW-focused to a broader approach also implied a different discourse. As in 
the CCW framework the discourse was mainly framed by the history of the convention and 
by established positions of influential possessor and producer states, most emphasis was put 
on issues of a technical nature as compared to the more principled humanitarian issues 
raised by the CMC and its members. Debates on cluster munitions in the GGE/CCW were 
hardly possible on, for example, the principle of use and targeting, but mostly narrowed down 
to technicalities regarding ‘failure or dud-rates’, ‘self-destructing mechanisms’, ‘sensor-
fuzing’, or reliability and accuracy of the bombs.  
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The CMC and individual CMC-partners have admirably been able to deconstruct many of 
these self-serving technical arguments by detailed, professional evidence-based studies, 
many of which were able to refute the arguments of the State Parties convincingly that 
basically aimed at the continued use of what were called ‘acceptable’ cluster munitions. At 
the same time, the coalition did not get bogged down in such technical arguments and 
recognised the need to (re-)politicise the debate. While continuing the debate in the 
GGE/CCW in an increasingly conscious and assertive manner, CMC opened a new line of 
operation on a different field with other actors and another, more political agenda outside the 
CCW. This simultaneous play of chess on different fields must have been a difficult and fine 
balancing act, but was done with considerable skill. It helped to frame the necessity of a 
‘humanitarian’ and political alternative to the stagnating and frustrating CCW talks that were 
exposed not in the last place by the serious and continuing inputs of CMC itself that 
characteristically remained without any effect in that particular setting. This in itself stimulated 
the counter movement that gradually emerged and the political disengagement from the 
CCW setting that it implied.               
 
With the benefit of hindsight it can certainly be judged a sharp and smart move to refocus the 
CMC efforts away from the narrow possibilities of the GGE/CCW, and to create an 
alternative. It would perhaps be too much to contend that CMC fabricated this move 
completely on its own and that it was only a result of conscious effort. It was as much due to 
the inflexibility and self-inflicted damage by the GGE/CCW that was blinded by their own 
interests and seemed to have lost touch with the world around it, and the trends prevailing in 
the wider context. It was interesting to note between brackets that this also, somewhat 
surprisingly, happened to The Netherlands, that despite a generally fairly progressive 
reputation in international and humanitarian affairs, not only had the dubious reputation to 
have dropped cluster bombs itself as one of the fifteen recorded users of this contested 
weapon world-wide, but also persevered in its defence of those weapons as legitimate and 
needed far into 2007.         
 
Over the years CMC demonstrated a conscious effort to think and rethink through its 
operations. There is a plethora of internal discussion and guidance documents that bear 
witness to this. Actions were often discussed in a timely manner and there was a high level 
of professionalism in its activities. This is undoubtedly due to the quality and experience of 
the CMC partners and especially of its SC members, as CMC itself had hardly a meaningful 
infrastructure or budget. The planning documents of all major events bear witness of a 
professional and simultaneously innovative machinery that combines long standing insights 
from peace activists with newer approaches and ideas, for example in the realm of visual and 
computer-based communication technologies. Yet, there is no evidence of a strong and 
centralised managerial approach and this begs some questions of how the CMC really 
managed to work so well. From the evidence available, we must conclude that it was the 
result of the experiences gained of the partners in long standing advocacy and lobby 
activities and the quality of the human resources available. The allocation of decentralised 
responsibilities to partners also seemed to have worked well. It induced a largely effective 
and fairly autonomous process of goal attainment.  
 
There must, in a large effort as that of the CMC, have been some setbacks and differences 
of opinion, but the available documentation does not give any major information on this. It 
seems that the CMC has been able to work overall in an efficient, down-to-earth and matter-
of-fact manner. There is hardly any lofty, idealistic language in the cluster munitions 
campaign and its documentation, though there is a consistent focus on the terrible 
humanitarian impact of the cluster bombs. It is, as if being appalled by the vague language 
and the manipulation thereof in the CWW and the imprecise, inaccurate and unreliable 
nature of cluster bombs, the CMC campaigners themselves became sharp, focused and no-
nonsense in their approach. That is not to say that they were not driven by deeply 
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humanitarian motives and a serious indignation of what cluster munitions bring about, but 
only that they have become fairly result-oriented and professional at that.           
  
It is not possible to give a detailed discursive analysis of the framing of the CMC campaign in 
the context of a best practice study, as that would require a research on its own. 
Nevertheless, there are noticeable discursive shifts in the language and framing of the issues 
by CMC over time. As observed above, some of these discursive shifts brought back both 
politics and humanity in what were earlier largely technico-military debates. They also put on 
the table goals and objectives that every time became somewhat more comprehensive and 
radical. It is interesting to observe that ‘conservative’ State Parties had no answer to these 
discursive shifts and started losing the discursive initiative, and in the end the whole debate. 
The discursive shifts in effect represented a radicalisation of the view points and were 
pushing the final result to a higher level outcome in terms of goals (to be) achieved. State 
parties had no choice than to follow in this trend and, interestingly, the final outcome of the 
Oslo process was very much unimaginable just five years earlier. Part of the discourse was 
also the conscious use of modern technology, reaching new global audiences in what used 
to be earlier a highly specialised and fairly insulated domain of international diplomacy. The 
move from the corridors in Geneva to what has been dubbed as a ‘People’s Treaty’ is in 
many ways a spectacular and formidable achievement both in its political, practical and 
discursive aspect.        
 
Apart from the international strategy, CMC partners have consistently carried on their 
national campaigns. The relationship between the international CMC efforts and the national 
campaigns has been multi-faceted. One the one hand, they reinforced and mutually 
supported each other. The international CMC office developed lobby material and tools, 
provided guidance, and coordinated work focused at the larger international initiatives. This 
provided a unity of purpose and presentational consistency to a wide variety of local 
initiatives. It also forged a sense of unity among the activists and was a source of 
encouragement. CMC was at the same time fed by the inputs and evidence-based studies 
carried out by its partners. It also needed national infrastructures to ‘reach the people’. A 
focus on particular key governments could also only be effectuated with the help of national 
movements. Similarly, the involvement of NGOs, survivors and champions from affected 
countries was an indispensable element in the campaign’s success. It gave a human face to 
the suffering caused by cluster munitions. However, the ‘ban advocates’ as they were called 
went far beyond making ‘visible’ what cluster munitions entailed. They were guided and 
trained in lobby and advocacy and mostly part of active, local NGOs in affected countries. 
Despite all those synergies, there was bound to be tension as well between the international 
CMC campaigners and their national counterparts. This was due to the challenge of 
balancing levels of diplomacy with activism. The SC was sometimes perceived to be 
behaving as diplomats and lobbyists rather than activists. Here it proved to be of the essence 
to continuously brief and involve the wider constituency of activists and explain to them the 
relevance of diplomatic efforts in the larger political framework. As analysed above, this not 
only involved a gradual process of discursive repositioning upward, but also needed a good 
communication strategy and transparency downwards. There was an additional issue of joint 
versus own organisational interests. The participating organisations, including SC members, 
were quite diverse and had different foci and interests. Some were highly specialised on 
particular aspects (e.g. Landmine Action), while others operated from a wider perspective, 
like IPCN. It seems, however, that this has been handled generally well and SC members 
were able to operate for the larger common interest, despite some unavoidable tensions in 
this regard.        
 
In The Netherlands IPCN focused mainly on the spoke-persons of the political parties 
through lobby, support and advice and on the public at large through media campaigns and 
publicity. It hoped that through Parliamentary debate, questions and motions the Dutch 
government policy could be influenced. As observed earlier, the Dutch government was a 
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reluctant partner in the Oslo process and stuck to its original positions till very late in the 
process before shifting towards a more supportive position of the CCM. It was noted that is 
was with mainly opposition parties that the IPCN lobby was successful. IPCN also knew to 
raise considerable if not prominent media and public interest. Like CMC in the international 
arena, IPCN published two influential reports that had a high impact, i.e. the report on the 
military utility of cluster bombs and its work on the disinvestment initiative.         
  
Results  
The signing of the CCM means that the original campaigning goals of the CMC issued at the 
Launch Conference on 13 November 2003 were realised. Above, it has been explained what 
efforts went into achieving these results and to what degree these results could also be seen 
as quite extraordinary. There is no need to repeat that all in this section again. Of course, the 
EIF of the CCM depends on further ratification, while also compliance to the CCM still needs 
to become subject of future monitoring. It is therefore appropriate that the CMC has 
formulated a new set of strategic objectives for the post EIF period.  
 
There are, a number of salient outcomes of the CMC campaign that merit further highlighting:  
 
First, the CMC campaign at both international and national level, has been able to include a 
variety of actors, constituencies and publics ranging from State Parties, affected countries, 
the GGE, the own government, politicians, parliamentarians, NGOs, survivors, media and the 
public at large. Though some of those actors were more difficult to reach or influence, this 
has been in and of itself a remarkable achievement. 
 
Second, CMC has been able to work as ‘a light structure’ in an efficient, professional and 
down-to-earth manner and has evolved as a respectable and recognised partner at all levels. 
While doing so, it has balanced the exigencies of diplomacy and more assertive activism 
well, achieving over the years a political and discursive shift that was substantive, strategic 
and tactic at the same time. It moved from the technico-military level of debate to a more 
overtly political and humanitarian inspired approach 
 
Third, CMC knew to derive professional strength and respect from its grounded, evidence-
based approach using thorough studies and involving respected experts, including from the 
military itself. The many studies, reports and papers emanating from the work of CMC and its 
partners are impressive as a result on their own, and have been guiding and dominating the 
debate to a large degree. Based on this evidence-based work, the CMC gained the upper 
hand in the debate and was able to argue with the more conservative State Parties. 
 
Fourth, instead of being forced to compromise and water-down its demands in the 
negotiation process, it has radicalised and strengthened them.  
 
Fifth, CMC sensed well if and when there were new opportunities and when and how to shift 
gears. The transition of a GGE/CCW-focused approach towards the Oslo process is the key 
example of this, but there are many others, such as the disinvestment campaign started by 
IPCN. It is notable that the CMC with the like-minded countries took the initiative in 
international diplomacy and did not loose it again to more conservative and powerful State 
Parties, achieving results that earlier would have been deemed unimaginable.  
 
Sixth, CMC related very well to a group of ‘like-minded’ governments and forged a strong 
and effective partnership. Yet, it is not totally clear whether such an approach is replicable in 
other circumstances or that it was contingent on a particular context and history, especially 
the lack of progress and irrelevance of the CCW. 
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Seventh, CMC harnessed all opportunities from conventional as well as new media. It has 
successfully used innovative methods of campaigning reaching large publics and new 
constituencies 
 
Instruments and actors 
As indicated above already CMC has made proper use of its resources and contacts with 
different actors. This was due to the high level of knowledge and experience in the SC and 
the possibility to effectively pool resources from the large network without the need to 
coordinate or steer that network in a laborious way. In its management CMC had to achieve 
a delicate balance between diplomacy and activism and between advocacy and professional 
expertise. Those different roles were not always easy to combine and this resulted in 
incidental tensions. CMC had also to contend with differences between the shared, common 
interests of the coalition as a whole, and the individual interests of the participant 
organisations. This was generally managed well.  
 
IPCN faced certain human resource and internal communication constraints that were partly 
the result of unpredictability of events in the broader context and a lack of long-term planning 
and clear articulation of expectations both internally and to other Dutch partners.   
 
Causation and attribution 
There are obviously many factors impinging or contingent on the success of the CMC 
campaign. These include global interests related to the geo-politics of possessor and user 
countries such as the US, Russia and China. They also included the processes, procedures 
and decision-making rules in the GGE/CCW mitigating against substantial progress. There 
was also on the positive side, the success of the 1997 MBT in Ottawa and an increasing 
societal abhorrence of the humanitarian consequences of the use of cluster munitions, 
graphically and tragically depicted by its continued use in recent wars in the Middle East and 
Georgia. In this overarching context, the vision, strategy and activities of the CMC itself 
clearly stand out as one of the determining factors in achieving the goal of the CCM. Though 
in most lobby and advocacy processes the issue of causation and attribution is difficult, in 
this case both internationally and in The Netherlands, there is no doubt about the definite 
influence and major impact of CMC work, as can easily be derived from the descriptive part 
of the study and all underlying extensive documentation thereof.        
 
Dynamics and environment 
CMC has been able to discursively and strategically relate very well to the changing 
conditions and contexts in the international arena. It had a fine nose to smell emerging trends 
and opportunities and capitalise on them. It was not afraid to change its course when needed 
and take new initiatives, if required. This has made that CMC was not only floating on the 
wave of trends and events, but also to a degree created, channelled and directed that wave.    
 
Compromise, trade-offs and politics  
Advocacy and lobby often face the need to compromise or accept trade-offs. In the case of 
CMC there have been continuous attempts by many states, including The Netherlands, to 
weaken and watering down the envisaged convention. It has been remarkable that those 
attempts have largely been warded off and that the CCM in the end became as robust and 
strong as it happened to be. This was no doubt due to skills of the Chairs and Presidents of 
the different meetings and conferences leading up to the signing of the Convention in Oslo, 
but also to the perseverance and campaigning skills of the CMC. The shifting political 
climate, the ongoing campaigns and provision of information, and public pressure moved 
states towards an increasingly radical text. Nevertheless, it is notable that CMC has 
maintained good working relationships with its government partners. Based on expert 
knowledge and professionalism on the one hand, and a mixture of assertiveness and skilful 
diplomacy on the other, it became recognised as an unavoidable, but also respectable 
partner. To a certain degree this was also the case in the relations with private companies. In 
 36 
relation to the disinvestment campaign of IPCN, the evidence base provided and negative 
publicity of dubious investments has already led to considerable progress, but also here a 
skilful combination of assertion and diplomacy seemed to be most effective. IPCN has 
developed the disinvestment initiative as a niche which continues to be followed-up up to 
present.  
 
People-centred advocacy and citizen diplomacy  
In several publications on advocacy there is the notion that advocacy should also be people-
centred and not only focus on higher-level authorities. This does relate to the development of 
the advocacy message itself and it being based on the views and needs of the population, as 
well as with regard to its destination. Here the widest possible audience should be addressed 
to give the message an impact beyond elitist circles. The CMC has definitely been able to 
make the CCM into a ‘People’s Treaty’. It has not only changed the course of traditional 
diplomacy, but overtook it and made it appear irrelevant. It formulated and implemented with 
like-minded state parties a strong and vibrant alternative to what increasingly was recognised 
to be a fossilised and impotent structure that was detached from wider societal trends. In this 
connection, the CCM has been hailed as a major example of citizen diplomacy, a form of 
diplomacy going beyond the earlier forms of Track II or III negotiations. Citizen diplomacy is 
characterised by the active involvement of civilian groups in international diplomacy beyond 
mere lobby or advocacy roles or the supplementary or alternative roles envisaged in 
alternative dispute resolution or community-based peace initiatives. Both in the GGE/CCW 
and the Oslo process, the CMC actively provided inputs and advice. In the Oslo process 
there was virtually direct involvement in the drafting of text, as CMC played a role in the main 
preparatory meetings and maintained close contact with host countries’ governments such 
as New Zealand, Ireland and Norway and other ‘like-minded’ countries. In the framework of 
this best practice study it not possible to gauge the impact of this further development - and 
perhaps consolidation since the Ottawa process - of citizen diplomacy in its entirety, but 
CMC certainly provides an interesting case for further analysis in this direction.         
 
Vulnerable groups and gender 
The CMC campaign focused on the special vulnerability of children with regard to ERWs, 
and naturally included assistance to victims who faced a series of physical and other 
handicaps. While in many other debates on contemporary conflict gender-specific 
approaches are promoted, there seems to be no such emphasis in the CMC campaign. 
Though there is a sense that women could be particularly vulnerable, e.g. in terms of 
agricultural labour, there has been no evidence of a specific gender-sensitive approach. This 
could, however, be of relevance in terms of awareness and victim assistance, such as in 
areas where patriarchical systems or religious norms suppress women’s participation in such 
activities or in the public realm in general.        
 
Joined-up nature of intervention 
The joined-up nature of advocacy relates to attempts to embed the specific action in broader 
initiatives. It could be said that CMC has been able to expand towards a broader approach 
from the start onwards. It transformed the initial narrow focus on ERWs to a more principled 
perspective on use and target. It embarked on discussions of military utility. It ended with 
pleading for a comprehensive ban. At the same time it demanded user responsibility and 
proper programmes for victims’ assistance in affected countries. It included disinvestment 
campaigns from a perspective of social corporate responsibility and transparency. In the 
choice of its partners it has been able to join up with like-minded states as well as global 
grass roots audiences, as explained above.  
 
Lessons learned from the ICBL 
Williams and Goose identified a set of key campaigning lessons that could be seen as 
ingredients for a successful citizen diplomacy campaigning model, as mentioned in chapter 
1. The CMC complied nearly completely to this list of key lessons.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
From the above discussion sixteen major conclusions can be drawn. 
 
1) CMC was established on the basis of its members’ experiences in the GGE/CCW 
negotiations and due to the increasing debate on cluster munitions caused by its actual 
use by NATO and the publication of critical reports on its humanitarian consequences. 
2) The CMC had a light structure that was able to operate efficiently, professionally and in 
a down-to-earth manner. 
3) By the adoption and signing of the CCM, the initial goals of the CMC were reached. It 
adopted as an appropriate follow-up on this achievement, a subsequent set of goals 
targeted at the rapid EIF of the CCM and the monitoring of compliance. 
4) The strategy, vision and activities of the CMC evolved in close interaction with the 
situation encountered in reality and the developments in policy practice.  
5) Starting from a largely technico-military approach that dominated the GGE/CCW 
discussion, CMC broadened the debate to include humanitarian and political 
perspectives to finally develop an alternative track next to the increasingly infertile 
GGE/CCW discussions. CMC was able to adopt a discursive transition that enabled it 
to gradually and timely radicalize and politicize its demands and approach. 
6) CMC has succeeded in carrying out this balancing act between diplomatic and activist 
approaches requiring different sets of skills and actors in a credible, self-conscious and 
assertive manner. Incidentally this juggling of roles and positions led to tensions with 
the activist constituencies of the participating NGOs. 
7) The CMC had a capacity to identify opportunities and to anticipate the need for 
substantive, strategic and tactical change, if required. 
8) The CMC international and national campaigns to ban the cluster munitions were 
based on clever contextual analysis, evidence-based, detailed expert information and 
studies that could deconstruct the arguments put forward by conservative State Parties 
opposing a ban, and a professional campaigning strategy and implementation based on 
both conventional lobby and advocacy methods and innovative visual and computer-
based communication strategies. 
9) In its campaign CMC build a strong interrelationship and synergy between the 
international and national campaigns, tasks and activities. 
10) CMC has forged close and effective linkages with like-minded governments.  
11) It was able to involve in its campaign larger segments of the grassroots and survivors in 
affected countries and to work in the direction of a ‘people’s treaty’. 
12) Drawing largely on the resources of its members the CMC was carried out with limited 
personnel and financial resources, attaining an overall high level of efficiency, 
something which is quite remarkable considering the nature of NGO-movements and 
the technical and diplomatic complexity of its mandate and tasks and the multitude of 
actors it had to deal with. 
13) CMC’s overall approach toward the CCM has been called citizen diplomacy, a new 
form of diplomacy involving civil society in an active and co-responsible way beyond 
advocacy, lobby and traditional track I and II approaches. 
14) IPCN focused its lobby and advocacy approach on parliament, media and the public at 
large. It proved difficult to influence the political sector beyond the opposition and to 
influence the Dutch government that was unwilling to revise its original stance and only 
started moving towards the Oslo process in a late stage. 
15) IPCN has generally been in achieving its goals and strategic objectives, but could 
improve on long-term planning the mobilization and timely usage of human resources 
and on internal communication and the explicit articulation of expectations vis-à-vis 
specialist internal departments as well as external partners. Its campaigns have been 
cheap and efficient. 
16) CMC both at the international level and in The Netherlands have been recognized as 
respectable and professional actors in their field. 
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ANNEXE 1  CHRONOLOGY OF THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT TO BAN 
CLUSTER BOMBS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chronology of the international movement to ban cluster bombs 
 
1999  
Jun. 1 Human Rights Watch (HRW) issues report, Ticking Time Bombs: 
NATO’s Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia  
Jun.  Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) issues report, Drop Today, Kill 
Tomorrow: Cluster Munitions as Inhumane and Indiscriminate Weapons 
Dec. 16 In a memorandum for CCW delegates, HRW calls for a moratorium on 
the use of cluster munitions 
2000  
Jun.  International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) issues report, Cluster 
Bombs and Landmines in Kosovo 
Aug.  Landmine Action (LAUK) issues report, Cluster Bombs: The military 
effectiveness and impact on civilians of cluster munitions 
Sept. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) holds a meeting 
in Nyon on ERW 
Nov. Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) issues report, Clusters of Death 
2001  
Jun. 14 Norwegian Parliament adopts a resolution urging the government to 
work to achieve an international ban on cluster munitions 
Nov. CCW mandate on ERW agreed at the Second Review Conference 
2002  
Mar. 18 LAUK issues report, Explosive Remnants of War: Unexploded ordnance 
and post-conflict communities 
Dec. 18 HRW issues report, Fatally Flawed: Cluster Bombs and Their Use by the 
United States in Afghanistan 
2003  
Apr.23-25 Ireland convenes a meeting on explosive remnants of war in Dublin that 
is hosted by Pax Christi Ireland. NGOs decide to establish an 
international coalition to tackle cluster bombs. 
Nov. 13  The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) is launched in The Hague, 
Netherlands 
Nov. 27 United Nations (UN) Inter Agency Standing Committee calls for a freeze 
on the use of cluster munitions 
Nov. 28 CCW states parties adopt Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, 
but fail to take any meaningful action to address cluster bombs 
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Dec. 11  HRW launches report, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian 
Casualties in Iraq 
2004  
Mar.  82 NGO participants from 21 countries gather at a CMC campaign 
workshop hosted by DanChurchAid on the margins of a conference on 
cluster munitions in the Danish Parliament  
Oct. 28 European Parliament calls on EU member states to enact moratoria on 
the use, stockpiling, production, transfer and export of cluster munitions, 
and negotiate an international legally binding instrument on the use of 
cluster munitions. 
2005  
Mar. HI Belgium mobilizes in Belgium to support the parliamentary process to 
ban cluster munitions. CMC campaigners support efforts through a 
global letter writing campaign to Belgian parliamentarians. 
Jun. Norwegian Government Pension Fund excludes eight foreign 
companies involved in the production of cluster munitions from the 
fund’s investments; more companies are excluded in 2006 and 2008 
2006  
Feb. 16  Belgian parliament passes first national law in the world banning cluster 
munitions 
Jun. Norway announces moratorium on cluster munition use, pending review 
of stockpile  
Jul.  Austrian parliament passes a resolution urging the government to 
support ‘the preparation of a CCW Protocol on cluster munitions and 
bombs or another appropriate international law instrument.’ 
Jul 16-Aug 14 Widespread cluster munition use in southern Lebanon during the conflict 
between Hezbollah and Israel 
Aug. 30 CMC hosts a CCW briefing on the impact of cluster munitions in 
Lebanon 
Oct. 1 LAUK issues report, Foreseeable harm: The use and impact of cluster 
munitions in Lebanon 
Oct. 25 Austria, Holy See, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden propose 
a CCW mandate to negotiate a legally-binding instrument to address the 
humanitarian concerns posed by cluster munitions 
Nov. 1 HI issues report, Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster 
Munitions 
Nov. 7 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan calls for a “freeze” on the use of 
cluster munitions in populated areas and the destruction of “inaccurate 
and unreliable” cluster munitions 
Nov. 8-9 CMC hosts an international meeting for campaigners in Geneva  
Nov. 17 At the CCW, 25 countries issue a joint declaration calling for an 
agreement that would prohibit the use of unreliable and/or inaccurate 
cluster munitions in civilian areas. Norwegian Foreign Minister J. Gahr 
Støre announces that Norway will hold a meeting to discuss cluster 
bombs outside the CCW 
2007  
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Feb.  Netwerk Vlaanderen issues report, Explosive Investments, Financial 
Institutions and Cluster Munitions 
Feb. 22 Landmine Action launches report, Cluster Munitions in Kosovo: Analysis 
of use, contamination and casualties 
Feb. 22-23  Norway hosts the Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, where 46 
states agree an “Oslo Declaration” committing them to conclude an 
international treaty on cluster munitions in 2008. 
Mar. 2 Belgium passes first law in the world to specifically prohibit financing of 
cluster munitions 
Mar. 15 South-East Asia Regional Conference on Cluster Munitions is held in 
Phnom Penh, Cambodia 
Mar. 22 New Zealand NGOs meet to establish the Aotearoa New Zealand 
Cluster Munition Coalition 
Apr. 18-20 ICRC hosts an experts meeting on cluster munitions in Montreux, 
Switzerland 
May  NPA launches report, Yellow Killers: The impact of cluster munitions in 
Serbia and Montenegro 
May  Handicap International (HI) launches report, Circle of Impact: The Fatal 
Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities 
May 23-25 Peru hosts the Lima Conference on Cluster Munitions, attended by 67 
countries, where a draft treaty text is introduced for discussion 
Sep. 4-5 Costa Rica hosts the San José Regional Conference on Cluster 
Munitions attended by 18 states from the region  
Oct. 3-4 Serbia hosts the Belgrade Conference of States Affected by Cluster 
Munitions, where HI launches its Ban Advocates initiative to enable 
cluster munition survivors to participate in the Oslo Process 
Oct. 30 Belgium hosts the European Regional Conference on Cluster Munitions 
in Brussels 
Nov. 5 The CMC calls its first Global Day of Action to Ban Cluster Bombs, in 
which campaigners in 40 countries take action 
Nov.  CCW states parties fail to agree on a mandate to negotiate a legally-
binding instrument on cluster munitions and instead agree to “negotiate 
a proposal” 
Dec.  NPA, the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, and Colin King 
Associates issue report, M85: An analysis of reliability  
Dec. 5  UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon calls for a prohibition on cluster 
munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. 
Dec. 5-7  Austria hosts the Vienna Conference on Cluster Munitions, where 138 
countries discuss the proposed international treaty 
Dec. 6  The Austrian parliament adopts a national law comprehensively banning 
cluster munitions 
2008  
Feb. 18-22 New Zealand hosts the Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, 
attended by 106 states, of which 82 endorse the Wellington Declaration 
committing to negotiate a cluster bomb treaty in Dublin in May 2008 on 
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the basis of the draft discussion text 
Mar. 31-Apr. 1 Zambia hosts the Livingstone Regional Conference on Cluster 
Munitions  
Apr. 4 The New Zealand Superannuation Fund announces it will divest from 
companies that manufacture cluster munitions  
Apr. 16-17 Mexico hosts the Regional Conference for Latin America and the 
Caribbean on Cluster Munitions in Mexico City  
Apr. 19 The second Global Day of Action to Ban Cluster Bombs is held, with 
actions taken by campaigners in 53 countries  
Apr. 24-25 Thailand hosts the Southeast Asia Regional Conference on Cluster 
Munitions in Bangkok 
May 19-30 Ireland hosts the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, 
attended by 127 states  
May 30 A total of 107 states adopt the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions on 
the final day of the Dublin negotiations. The CMC and Mines Action 
Canada launch the “People’s Treaty” petition 
Aug. 13 CMC members hold candlelight vigils and other actions to mark the 
second year since the cluster bombing of South Lebanon 
Aug-Sep. CMC members protest Georgia and Russia’s use of cluster bombs in 
South Ossetia 
Sep. 18-19 Bulgaria hosts the Sofia Regional Conference on the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions 
Sep. 29-30 Uganda hosts the Kampala Regional Conference on the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions  
Oct. 1 The ‘Ban Bus’ begins its eight-week-long awareness-raising journey 
from Belgrade to Oslo 
Oct. 20-22  Lao PDR hosts the South East Asia Regional Conference on the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions in Xiengkhouang 
Oct. 27 The CMC calls its first Global Week of Action to Ban Cluster Bombs, in 
which campaigners in 74 countries take action  
Oct. 29-30   A European Faith Leaders Conference on Cluster Munitions is held in 
Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Nov. 6-7 Ecuador hosts the Quito Regional Conference on the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions 
Nov. 11-12 Lebanon hosts the Beirut Regional Conference on Cluster Munitions  
Dec. 3-4 Norway hosts the Oslo Signing Conference for the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions, attended by 122 states. A total of 94 states sign the 
Convention in Oslo in front of a CMC delegation of 250 campaigners  
2009  
Mar. 10 NPA launches report, The Impact of unexploded cluster munitions in 
Serbia 
Mar. 11 President Obama signs into law a permanent ban on nearly all U.S. 
cluster bomb exports 
Mar. 18 DR Congo signs and Lao PDR ratifies the Convention on Cluster 
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Munitions during a special event held at UN headquarters in New York 
Apr. 14 HRW launches report, A Dying Practice: Use of Cluster Munitions by 
Russia and Georgia in August 2008 
May 1 Cluster bomb survivor Branislav Kapetanovic accepts the Tipperary 
International Peace Award in Ireland on behalf of the CMC 
May 29 Landmine Action and HRW launch report prepared by Landmine 
Monitor, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice 
May 29 The CMC calls its second Global Week of Action Against Cluster 
Bombs, with campaigners in 58 countries taking action 
Jun. 25-26 Germany hosts the Berlin Conference on the Destruction of Cluster 
Munitions, attended by 87 treaty signatories  
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ANNEXE 2 CMC FILES STUDIED  
 
 
Minutes CMC Meetings  
 
Minutes ERW Meeting, 6 February 2003 (ERW111/30/2003)  
 
Minutes ERW Meeting, 6 February 2003 (ERW111/31/2003)  
 
Minutes NGO Meeting Dublin, 25 April 2003 (ERW111/25/2003)  
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Minutes Core Group Meeting, 25 April 2003 (ERW111/29/2003) 
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Minutes Interim Core Group Meeting, 14 May 2003 
(ERW111/34/2003)  
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Minutes Core Group Meeting, 15 June 2003 (ERW111/33/2003) 
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Minutes Core Group Meeting, 19 June 2003 (ERW111/136/2003)  
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Minutes Interim Steering Committee Meeting, The Hague, 11 
November 2003 (ERW111/136/2003) 
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Minutes Steering Committee Meeting, Geneva, 12 November 
2004  
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Minutes Steering Committee Meeting, Vienna, 8 December 2007  
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Steering Committee Meeting Agenda, Dublin, 16 May 2008  
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Steering Committee Meeting Agenda, New York, 13 September 
2008  
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Final Report Steering Committee Retreat, New York, 13-14 
September 2008  
 
  
Studies, reports, papers, proceedings, memoranda etc. 
 
Austcare and Handicap International, ‘Sensor-fuzing and SMArt submunitions. An unproven 
technology?’, February 2008  
 
C. King Associates Ltd., Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and Norwegian 
People’s Aid, M85, An analysis of reliability, 2007 
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Information Document (ERW111/134/2003) 
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Conference Agenda, International Launch Conference, 12-13 
November 2003 (ERW111/53/2003) 
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Statement CCW Meeting of States Parties, 27 November 2003 
(ERW111/133/2003) 
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Cluster Munition Coalition, ‘New international NGO coalition says states must do more on 
cluster munitions and other explosive remnants of war’, Press Release, 28 November 2003 
(ERW111/125/2003) 
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Funding proposal 2004 
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Statement by the Cluster Munition, Geneva, 5 July 2004  
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Working paper ‘The Concerns about Submunitions from a Military 
Perspective’, submitted in Geneva, 5 July 2004 
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, CMC Closing Statement CCW, 19 November 2004  
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Cluster Munition Coalition Strategy for 2005  
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, CMC Institutional Code of Conduct (n.d.)  
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, ‘Cluster munition casualties in Lebanon highlight need for global 
moratorium’, Press Release, 22 August 2006 
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Appeal of the Cluster Munition Coalition to the Vienna Conference 
on Cluster Munitions, 4 December 2007 
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, ‘More than 120 countries gather in Vienna to discuss cluster 
bomb ban treaty’, Press Release, 4 December 2007 
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Observations on the draft Cluster Munitions Convention: 
Summary of key points (n.d.) 
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Investment in Civilian Suffering To Be halted by Future Cluster 
Munitions Convention, CMC Policy Paper (n.d.) 
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Options for the future of the Cluster Munition Coalition, 2008  
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Implementation of the Rapid Entry into Force Action Plan, 2008 
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, CMC Statement: GGE/CCW, 15 July 2008  
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, CMC observations on the paper entitled ‘Cluster Munitions’, 
submitted by the Chairperson to the GGE/CCW, 25 July 2008  
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions 2008, 
Lobbying Guide 
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions 2008, 
Participant Handbook 
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions 2008, Policy 
Papers 
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, CMC Intervention on Article 4 on prohibitions and restrictions. 
GGE/CCW, 4 September 2008  
 
Cluster Munition Coalition, CMC Interventions on definitions and on prohibitions and 
restrictions. GGE/CCW, 5 September 2008  
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Cluster Munition Coalition, CMC Strategy for CCW, November 2008  
 
Diplomatic Conference on the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, Convention on 
Cluster Munitions, 30 May 2008 
 
Germany, ‘Reliability and Use of Cluster Munitions’, presented to the Working Group on 
Explosive Remnants of War, Tenth Session of the GGE/CCW meeting, Geneva, 10 March 
2005 
 
Human Rights Watch, Intervention by Stephen Goose, Closing Session of the Meeting of 
States parties to the CCW, Geneva, Switzerland, 19 November 2004 
 
Human Rights Watch, Worldwide Production and Export of Cluster Munitions, HRW briefing 
paper, April 2005 
 
Human Rights Watch, Survey of Cluster Munition Policy and Practice, Memorandum for 
Delegates to the Fourteenth Session of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts, June 
2006 
 
Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch Observations on CCW Draft Protocol on Cluster 
Munitions, September 2008 
 
Human Rights Watch and International Human Rights Clinic, Interoperability and the 
prohibition on Assistance, Memorandum to delegates of the Dublin Diplomatic Conference 
on Cluster Munitions, May 2008 
 
IKV Pax Christi, Notitie ‘Het Nederlandse beleid inzake clustermunitie’, 2008 
 
IKV Pax Christi and 4 other NGOs, Letter to members of Dutch parliament re cluster 
munition, 11 October 2007 
 
Mines Action Canada, Overview of States Parties’ national policy on CCW, 2003 
 
Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken and Minister of Defensie, brief aan de Voorzitter van de 
Tweede Kamer van de Staten-generaal, inz. wapenbeheersing: start van de 
onderhandelingen te Genève over ontplofbare oorlogsresten, 15 mei 2003 
(ERW111/37/2003) 
 
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Beschikking ERW Clustermunitiecampagne, 29 
september 2003 (ERW111/46/2003) 
 
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Kamerbrief inzake schriftelijke antwoorden naar 
aanleiding van de eerste termijn van de Tweede Kamer tijdens de begrotingsbehandeling 
van Buitenlandse Zaken, 19 oktober 2006 
 
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Kamerbrief inzake Lima-conferentie over clustermunitie, 
12 juli 2007 
  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003) ‘Reducing the threat of Explosive Remnants of War: the 
Dutch approach’, opening address by Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the occasion of an international conference marking 
the start of the ‘Cluster Munition Coalition’, Grote Kerk, The Hague, 13 November 2003 
(ERW111/153/2003) 
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NGO Statement delivered by Anne Quesney, Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons, 12-13 December 2002 (ERW111/39/2003) 
 
Pax Christi (2003) Explosive ricochet, ERW / Cluster Munitions Campaign, project proposal 
for the realisation of a Launch Conference & International Exhibition, 31 August 2003, 
Utrecht (ERW111/4/2003W) 
 
Pax Christi, Invitation for the Official Launch of the Cluster Munition Coalition by Jan Gruiters, 
Director Pax Christi NL, Utrecht 5 November 2003 (ERW111/60/2003) 
 
Pax Christi (2004) Pax Christi Statement to the CCW delegations, 16 July 2004 
 
Pax Christi (2005) ‘Ban de Clusterbom’, Concept Campagneplan Clustermunitie, oktober 
2005 
 
Pax Christi and UNICEF Nederland, Letter to spoke-persons of political parties in Dutch 
parliament re cluster munition, 29 August 2006 
 
Pax Christi International, ‘Respect International Humanitarian Law in Middle East’, written 
statement to the Sub-commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
Brussels, 3 August 2006 
 
Pax Christi Ireland, ‘Explosive Remnants of War and Development, Voices from the Field’, 
Conference Report, Dublin Castle 23-25 April 2003 
 
Pax Christi Netherlands, Statement to the GGE of the CCW, Geneva, 8 November 2004 
 
Pax Christi Netherlands, Intervention Pax Christi Netherlands, 10th session GGE CCW, 10 
March 2005  
 
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar 2003-2004, aanhangsel van de 
Handelingen, 149-150. 
 
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar 2003-2004, Goedkeuring van het op 28 
november 2003 te Genève totstandgekomen Aanvullend Protocol inzake ontplofbare 
oorlogsresten, 29 848 (R 1775), nr. 1 (Koninklijke Boodschap), nr. 2 (Voorstel van Wet), nr. 3 
(Memorie van Toelichting), nr. 4 (Nota van Verbetering), nr. 5 (Verslag) 
 
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar 2005-2006, aanhangsel van de 
Handelingen, 109. 
 
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar 2005-2006, aanhangsel van de 
Handelingen, 237-239 
 
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar 2006-2007, aanhangsel van de 
Handelingen, 2565 
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ANNEXE 3 IOB CHECKLIST 
 
BEOORDELINGSLIJST EVALUATIEONDERZOEK 
 
Deze beoordelingslijst wordt gehanteerd om de opzet en uitvoering van Programma-evaluaties (PE's)4 binnen het 
Medefinancieringsstelsel (MFs) te toetsen aan gangbare kwaliteitseisen voor sociaal-wetenschappelijk onderzoek. 
Daartoe wordt eerst een aantal basiskenmerken van de betreffende PE geregistreerd. Deze kenmerken hebben 
achtereenvolgens betrekking op het geëvalueerde object, het uitgevoerde onderzoek, de daarbij betrokken actoren en het 
onderzoeksrapport. Vervolgens vindt de toetsing plaats aan de drie kwaliteitscriteria: Validiteit, Betrouwbaarheid en 
Bruikbaarheid. Deze criteria zijn geoperationaliseerd door de definiëring van een aantal indicatoren, die op hun beurt 
worden onderscheiden in één of meer concrete componenten. De beoordeling op deze (in totaal ..) componenten vindt 
plaats op een vierpunts-schaal: slecht – matig – redelijk – goed. 
 
 
INVENTARISATIE VAN KENMERKEN 
 
EVALUATIEOBJECT 
titel The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), 2003-2009 
type object International and national advocacy and lobby campaign 
land(en), regio('s) World-wide, The Netherlands 
financieel belang € 345,367 direct costs, and salary costs for 6.4 FTE amounting to a maximum of approximately € 350,00 (period 2003-2009) 
evaluatieperiode 2003-2009 
EVALUATIEONDERZOEK 
gebruiksdoelstelling (i) policy development / organisational learning (ii) management decisions (iii) accountability 
type onderzoek Best practice study; review 
onderzoekskosten Salaries € 11,573 (1.46 %) 
financieringsbron IKV Pax Christi 
doorlooptijd 
The study was started in the month of October 2009, week 41. A 
first draft based on the desk study was ready in week 43. The final 
key informant interviews were held in week 45, comments on the 
first draft incorporated, and the report was completed on 18 
November 2009.    
ACTOREN 
opdrachtgever IKV Pax Christi 
sturing of begeleiding Miriam Struyk and Roos Boer (responsible for CMC at IPCN) 
evaluatoren Prof. dr ir Georg Frerks (Disaster Studies Group, Wageningen University) 
kwalificaties Yes (see ‘about the author’ op p. 6)  
selectiecriteria 
The assignment took place in the context of a 4-year during 
framework agreement between Wageningen University and IPCN. 
This framework agreement was tendered and Disaster Studies 
selected. For the individual studies under this framework agreement 
there is no new tender procedure, though for each study a contract 
is signed. 
EVALUATIERAPPORT 
                                                 
4 Deze omvatten zowel "interne" PE's van individuele MFS-organisaties als gezamenlijke PE's ondernomen in het kader van een tijdelijk of 
permanent samenwerkingsverband. 
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datum 18 November 2009 
auteur(s) Georg Frerks  
onderzoeksvraagstelling Yes (p. 8) 
ToR 
Yes, ‘Best Practice Study Campagne Cluster Munitie’ (in addition, 
there are the general questions for best practice study agreed 
between IPCN and Wageningen University). Reference to the 
research questions in the ToR is made on p. 9. 
omvang 57 pagina’s, including annexes 
 
 
TOELICHTING OP INVULLING INVENTARISATIE VAN KENMERKEN 
 
 
titel de naam van het onderzoek volgens de definitieve versie van het eindrapport 
type object (bijv.) programma / project / sector / thema / instrument / strategie / organisatie 
land(en), regio('s) gebied(en) waar het onderzoek betrekking op heeft 
financieel belang het bedrag aan MFS-fondsen dat tijdens de onderzochte periode aan het evaluatieobject is besteed 
evaluatieperiode de periode die het onderzoek bestrijkt 
gebruiksdoelstelling (i) verantwoording en/of (ii) beleidsontwikkeling (leren) en/of (iii) managementbeslissing 
type onderzoek (bijv.) ex post / interim / evaluatie / review5 / evaluatie & formulering6 / 
onderzoekskosten in € (en in % van de financiële belang van het evaluatieobject) 
financieringsbron het budget(onderdeel) waaruit het onderzoek wordt gefinancierd 
doorlooptijd de periode die met de uitvoering van het onderzoek is gemoeid 
opdrachtgever functionaris of instantie die de ToR vaststelt en beslist over de aanvaarding van de eindrapportage 
sturing/begeleiding samenstelling van (eventueel ingesteld) gezelschap dat begeleiding of sturing gaf aan de evaluatie 
evaluatoren namen (+ eventuele werkkringen) van zowel teamleider als teamleden 
kwalificaties vermelding van de voornaamste opleidings- en ervaringsgegevens van de onderzoekers: ja / nee 
selectiecriteria zijn de criteria aan de hand waarvan de onderzoekers zijn geselecteerd expliciet vermeld (bijvoorbeeld in de ToR): ja / nee 
datum van de definitieve versie van het eindrapport 
auteur(s) namen (+ werkkringen) indien anderen dan de evaluatoren zelf 
onderzoeksvraagstelling vermelding of herhaling (uit de ToR) in de hoofdtekst van de onderzoeks–vragen, met locatie: ja (p. …) / nee  
ToR zijn deze – volledig of verkort – als bijlage in het rapport opgenomen? ja (volledig/verkort). p. … / nee 
omvang van het rapport in pagina's (inclusief bijlagen) 
 
                                                 
5 review: ‘lichte’vorm van evaluatieonderzoek, voornamelijk gebaseerd op reeds bestaand materiaal. 
6 evaluatie & formulering: van deze combinatie is sprake als de onderzoeksopdracht zodanig expliciete aanwijzingen voor de opstelling van 
aanbevelingen ten behoeve van de voortzetting van de te evalueren activiteiten bevat, dat het risico bestaat dat de aanbevelingen de 
evaluatieve bevindingen gaan sturen in plaats van omgekeerd. 
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BEOORDELINGSCRITERIA, INDICATOREN EN COMPONENTEN 
 
 
1 VALIDITEIT (meet het onderzoek daadwerkelijk wat het beoogt te meten?) score 
1.1 Probleemstelling  
1.1.1 Helderheid van probleemstelling en uitwerking in onderzoeksvragen. Zie p. 8   
1.1.2 Definitie van evaluatiecriteria. Zie: p. 9-10  
1.2 Evaluatieobject  
1.2.1 Definitie, werking en afbakening van het onderzoeksobject. It concerns the strategy, activities and results of the Cluster Munitions Coalition (CMC), as documented in chapter 2, 3 and 4.  
1.2.2 
Situering van het evaluatieobject in beleidsmatige en institutionele context. See for the 
GGE/CCW discussions in Geneva, the history of the CMC and some major events impacting 
on the campaign chapter 2 and 3. The Dutch context is elaborated in chapter 4. 
 
1.3 Beleidstheorie  
1.3.1 Weergave of reconstructie van interventielogica en resultaatniveaus. The strategies are mainly discussed in the chapter 3 and analysed in chapter 5.     
1.3.2 
Operationalisering van resultaatmeting via indicatoren. On the basis of literature on (the 
evaluation of) advocacy and lobby campaigns (incl. Clapham & Wameyo; Kelly) the author 
has defined the key concepts (p. 8-9), and selected nine evaluative themes for a narrative 
analysis (p. 9-10), that are systematically dealt with in the discussion chapter and the 
conclusions. He also looked at lessons learned from the MBT and the Ottowa Process. 
 
1.4 Analyse  
1.4.1 Gegevensbronnen, -verzameling en verwerking. The report gives a detailed list of literature and sources used under References and Annexe 1 CMC Files Studied.   
1.4.2 
Onderbouwing van conclusies door bevindingen. The chapter 2, 3 and 4 provide a direct, 
chronologically and thematically organised account of the research findings. The discussion 
and concluding chapters build on those materials. 
 
 
 
2 BETROUWBAARHEID (hoe stabiel zijn de onderzoekuitkomsten?) score 
2.1 Onderzoeksmethoden  
2.1.1 Specificatie en verantwoording van gehanteerde onderzoeksmethoden. See for some methodological aspects of the best practice study the pages 8-11.  
2.1.2 
Verificatie van gegevens / Triangulatie. The direct responsible CMC officers at IPCN gave 
feed-back on the complete draft version of the report. Triangulation took place by comparing 
the different sources and checking the interview data with those on file.   
 
2.2 Reikwijdte  
2.2.1 
Representativiteit van de steekproeftrekking c.q. case study-selectie. There was no sample 
procedure followed. It concerned a unique case-study, in which all available relevant material 
was studied. 
 
2.2.2 
Vermelding van beperkingen van het onderzoek. The research took place in retrospect. This 
means that the researcher was not present at the events and conferences described. The study 
was fully based on files and some retrospective interviews, without the possibility of direct 
and/or participatory observation and (cross-)checking.  
 
2.3 Onafhankelijkheid  
2.3.1 Van het bronmateriaal (t.o.v. de belanghebbenden). The author had access to all files on the subject available with IPCN.  
2.3.2 Van de evaluatoren (t.o.v. de belanghebbenden). The evaluator has not faced any interference by IPCN in the course of his work.    
2.4  Onderzoeksverloop en kwaliteitsbewaking  
2.4.1 Verantwoording van het onderzoeksverloop. There was an initial briefing meeting and feedback on the first draft of the report   
2.4.2 Kwaliteitsbewaking via intern of extern toezicht. IPCN got the opportunity to provide feedback on the first and second version of the report.   
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3 BRUIKBAARHEID (hoe goed zijn de onderzoeksuitkomsten toepasbaar?) score 
3.1 Presentatie  
3.1.1 Helderheid van de onderzoeksdoelstelling. The rationale of the study is formulated on p. 8  
3.1.2 Toegankelijkheid van de onderzoeksresultaten. The report is public.   
3.2 Aansluiting  
3.2.1 
Beantwoording van de onderzoeksvragen door de conclusies. The discussion in chapter 5 and 
the conclusions in chapter 6 systematically deal with the research questions and the themes 
identified for the evaluation of advocacy en lobby on p. 10. 
 
3.2.2 
Uitvoerbaarheid van lessen of aanbevelingen. The lessons learned are formulated in chapter 5 
and 6. They basically contain ingredients for success, but also some issues that could be 
further strengthened.    
 
 
TOELICHTING OP INVULLING BEOORDELINGSCRITERIA, -INDICATOREN EN COMPONENTEN 
 
 
 VALIDITEIT 
1.1.1 
De probleemstelling formuleert kernachtig waarop (aan de hand van welke, met name genoemde, 
criteria) het evaluatieobject wordt beoordeeld. 
De onderzoeksvragen vormen samen de operationalisering van de probleemstelling. 
1.1.2 
Eenduidige omschrijving van de maatstaven – zoals doeltreffendheid – die worden aangelegd om het 
evaluatieobject te beoordelen. 
1.2.1 
Opsomming. omschrijving en begrenzing van de verzameling (operationele populatie) van onderzoeks-
eenheden (naar type, doelgroep, locatie, periode, instelling, financiële omvang, enz.) waarop de 
onderzoeksresultaten betrekking hebben. 
1.2.2 Weergave van relevante beleidsmatige achtergronden en uitgangspunten, alsmede van het institutionele krachtenveld waarin het evaluatieobject opereert. 
1.3.1 
Uiteenzetting van de beleidstheorie met de veronderstellingen over causale en finale relaties die aan 
onderzochte interventies ten grondslag heeft gelegen, en over de gehanteerde doel–middelenhiërarchie 
met de onderscheiden resultaatniveaus. 
1.3.2 Mate waarin de indicatoren die op de verschillende resultaatniveaus zijn gedefinieerd, als specifiek, meetbaar en tijdgebonden kunnen worden beschouwd. 
1.4.1 Zorgvuldigheid waarmee de gebruikte gegevensbronnen zijn geselecteerd, alsmede de nauwkeurigheid en transparantie waarmee gegevens uit die bronnen worden geanalyseerd en verwerkt. 
1.4.2 Mate waarin de conclusies daadwerkelijk worden gedekt door de onderzoeksbevindingen. 
 BETROUWBAARHEID 
2.1.1 Nauwkeurige identificatie en rechtvaardiging van de gehanteerde onderzoeksmethoden en –technieken. 
2.1.2 Mate waarin gegevens zijn gecontroleerd, en verschillende bronnen/methoden zijn gebruikt om informatie over dezelfde kenmerken en verschijnselen te verzamelen. 
2.2.1 Mate waarin de conclusies uit de onderzochte steekproef c.q. van de uitgevoerde case studies gelden voor de hele onderzoekspopulatie. 
2.2.2 Vermelding van en uitleg over (eventuele) tekortkomingen van het onderzoek en restricties aan de generaliseerbaarheid van de bevindingen en conclusies. 
2.3.1 
Mate waarin selectie en inhoud van geraadpleegde gegevensbronnen, met name documentatie en 
respondenten, onafhankelijk waren van belanghebbenden bij de evaluatie zoals opdrachtgevers, 
uitvoerders en beneficiënten. 
2.3.2 Mate waarin de evaluatoren onafhankelijk opereerden en rapporteerden van belanghebbenden bij het onderzoek zoals opdrachtgevers, uitvoerders en beneficiënten. 
2.4.1 Beschrijving en verklaring van het verloop van de evaluatie, inclusief eventuele aanpassingen die ten opzichte van de oorspronkelijke opzet zijn aangebracht. 
2.4.2 Controle op het ontwerp en/of de uitvoering van het onderzoek door een begeleidings- of stuurgroep binnen of buiten de MFS-organisatie(s). 
 BRUIKBAARHEID 
3.1.1 Helderheid van de specificatie van het (buiten het onderzoek zelf gelegen – externe) doel van de evaluatie, waarvoor de onderzoeksuitkomsten zullen worden of zijn gebruikt. 
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3.1.2 Duidelijkheid en volledigheid waarmee in het evaluatierapport en de samenvatting ervan de essentie van het onderzoek, en met name de hoofdbevindingen, zijn weergeven. 
3.2.1 Volledigheid waarmee alle onderzoeksvragen door de conclusies worden beantwoord. 
3.2.2 Praktische uitvoerbaarheid van gepresenteerde aanbevelingen en de mate waarin deze binnen het bereik liggen van betrokken verantwoordelijken, met name van de evaluatie-opdrachtgevers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
